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Abstract 
Recently, a growing body of research explores the effects of competition preferences on wages. 
This thesis attempts to review important studies which look into how competitiveness affect 
education and labor market outcomes. I start my thesis with traditional explanations for gender pay 
gap. In Section 2 I provide some facts to show gender differences in real outcomes in general. 
Section 3 discusses Gneezy et al. (2003) and Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), which pioneer this 
line of researches. Then I analyze possible affecting factors by using these two methods. Even 
though there is only one study which compares countries directly, to my knowledge, overall it’s 
much easier to detect gender differences for competition preferences in developed countries than in 
developing countries. This section is also designed to shed light on further cross-country 
comparison.        
Section 4 lists papers which try to use this emerging theory to explain gender differences in 
outcomes of education and labor market. The phenomenon that women are better educated but still 
shy away from STEM fields could be explained by competition preferences to some extent. 
Moreover, I put forward policy implications for education and labor market respectively. However, 
the two policy recommendations need to be treated with caution as empirical evidences, especially 
those about quota, seems not to support conclusion drawn from experimental results.  
Section 5 assesses the relative importance and unsolved issues of competition preferences, to shed 
light on future research. It’s inspiring that this psychological factor seems to play a role outside the 
lab, however compare with other factors such as occupation and industry,  and considering key 
questions such as how preferences evolve remain to be determined further studies still have a long 
way to go.  
Section 6 concludes this master’s thesis by summarizing current achievements and pointing out 
possible improvement for later research. 
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1. Introduction 
The gender pay gap is persistent and universal despite women’s advancement and 
advancement. According to Altonji and Blank (1999), traditional explanations for the wage 
gap are as following: 
The human capital investment model argues that the return to skills based on expected 
labor force participation if these skills enhance market productivity more than non-market 
productivity and hence predicts that people who are going to spend less time in the labor 
market would reduce investment, such as related education and training, in valuable 
marketplace skills. Therefore, the return would be higher for full-time workers and for 
people who are less likely to do non-market work.  
The comparative advantage theory contends that men and women are advantaged in 
different industries, which could lead to gender differences in the allocation of time. 
However, as the focus of labor market transit from physical strength to cognitive skills, 
now comparative advantages are less effective in explaining gender differences in labor 
market outcomes. 
Discrimination is defined as a situation in which equal productive people are treated 
unequally (receive different wages or face different demands) that has to do with an 
observable characteristic. The main types of discrimination are taste-based discrimination 
and statistical discrimination. The former refers to distaste against members of minority 
groups, such as employer, employee and consumer discrimination. Ideally employer and 
employee discrimination would lead wages to converge in the long run whereas in case of 
consumer discrimination, wage differentials depend on customer contacts and distribution 
of just and prejudiced customers. The latter one is driven by imperfect information and 
subdivided into two strands. The first examines the effects of different prior beliefs about 
productivity in which members of minority groups earn less than equally productive 
counterpart from majority groups. The second investigates the impacts of differences in the 
precision of information about individual productivity. In this case, if the measure, say the 
test, predicts productivity more precisely for males, high-scoring males would be paid more 
than their female counterpart whereas the pattern is reversed among workers with low test 
scores. 
The group preferences highlight the trade-off between work and leisure and tastes for 
different kinds of jobs. For instance, the compensating differentials theory maintains that 
jobs which are less preferable due to danger or dirty would offer a wage premium. The key 
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question is, as I would discuss below, how and why preferences might evolve throughout 
the life span, which relevant evidences are scarce.  
2. Gender differences in outcomes: facts 
2.1 Education 
2.1.1 Educational attainment 
 
Figure 1: population who aged 25-64 and attend tertiary education1 
In all G7 countries, women attend tertiary education more often than male counterpart. On 
average, women from OECD countries are more likely to receive tertiary education, too. 
The gender gap is even larger among the young generation, who is aged between 25 and 34 
years with the exception of Germany.  
                                                        
1 The data of Japan is from another category. 
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Figure 2: graduation rate in tertiary education for people younger than 30-year-old 
As we can see, in all countries which have relevant data, young women have a higher 
overall graduation rate in tertiary education2.  
2.1.2 Academic performance 
PISA is the Programme for International Student Assessment launched by OECD and held 
every three years. 15-year-old students would be tested in reading, mathematics and 
science3. OECD chooses 15-year-old on purpose as in majority of countries, students can 
decide whether to continue their study at this stage. Therefore, PISA scores of students 
from different countries are relatively comparable. 
                                                        
2 Tertiary education in this graph stands for ISCED 2011 level 5-8, hence includes short-cycle, Bachelor’s, Master’s and 
Doctoral level.  
3 I don’t include science scores for two reasons. First, compare with reading and math performance, science scores are 
mixed. Second, as I would discuss throughout the whole thesis, especially in section 3.2.7, the focus would be math 
(male-favoring task) and verbal task (female-favoring task). 
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Figure 3: PISA reading performance in 2015 by sex, by country 
In all countries, girls outperform boys and the female advantage is significant at 5 % level 
of significance. 
 
Figure 4: PISA mathematical performance in 2015 by sex, by country 
In majority of countries, boys have higher scores in mathematical part of PISA with the 
exception of Norway, Sweden, Korea and Finland. However, only in Finland girls 
outperform boys at 5 % level of significance. On average, boys have significant better 
mathematical performance.  
2.2 Employment 
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2.2.1 Gender wage gap 
 
Figure 5: the difference between median earnings of men and women relative to median 
earnings of men in 2016 (percentage) 
The gender pay gap is a universal phenomenon, ranging from 3.7 % in Belgium to the 
36.7 % in Korea. On average, the gender pay gap of OECD countries is 13.8 %.   
 
Figure 6: the difference between median earnings of men and women relative to median 
earnings of men in 2010-2016 (percentage)4 
The gender pay gap is longstanding and stagnant. On average, the gender pay gap of OECD 
                                                        
4 Italy and France, two member countries of G7, are excluded because data is not available. 
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countries is about 14 percentage points. 
2.2.2 Female share of seats on boards of the largest publicly listed companies 
Compare with Italy, France and Germany5, the female share in Nordic countries evolve 
steadily except Iceland, which experience a sharp increase from 2011 to 2013. The historic 
high appears in Iceland in 2013, yet still lower than 50 %. 
 
Figure 7: Female share of seats on boards of the largest publicly listed companies 
 
3. Gender and competition 
3.1 Experimental Designs 
The experimental approach is now gaining popularity. Charness and Kuhn (2011) argue 
that laboratory experiments have several advantages. First, this setting allows labor 
economists to have more control over variables. It’s difficult to isolate the effects of 
environmental factors from empirical data. Second, it enhances the ability to put a specific 
theoretical model in practice and enables labor economists to compare the prediction of 
theoretical model with the results which could be in conflict with each other even 
experimenters attempt to create an ideal context. Third, laboratory experiments have lower 
costs and are relatively easy to elicit individual beliefs. Finally, labor economists are able to 
investigate strategies used by agents in solving dynamic problems. 
                                                        
5 At first I intend to include G7 and Nordic countries. The United States, Canada and Japan are not included due to the 
lack of data in 2011-2015. The United Kingdom is also excluded for simplicity as it shares a similar trend with Germany. 
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3.1.1 Performance in a competitive environment  
Gneezy et al. (2003) is the first paper to examine gender differences in performance in a 
competitive environment. Participants are divided into six-people groups and required to 
perform the maze-solving task, which has five difficulty levels. Only in the last treatment 
could participants set the difficulty level. In the first three treatments, the groups are gender 
balanced. After students write down their scores, the experimenter would check the records 
to ensure accuracy. Although gender is not pointed out during the experiment, participants 
could see each other in the laboratory and hence could determine the gender composition of 
their group. Participants don’t know the performance of others across treatment. 
The first treatment, piece rate serves as a benchmark for gender differences in performance. 
In this treatment, participants could get 2 shekels for each correctly solved maze. In the 
second treatment, participants would perform in competitive tournament and be paid 
according to their performances: only the best performer could be rewarded 12 shekels for 
each correctly solved maze. The tournament has an uncertain payoff and payoff depends on 
others’ performance. Thus the authors introduce the third treatment named as random pay, 
in which the only winner is selected randomly, to disentangle the effects of uncertainty and 
interdependence from the effects of competitive environments. In treatment 1 and 3, men 
perform better but the gender differences in performance are not significant. The gender 
differences in mean performances of two treatments are both 1.5 mazes. Hence the authors 
conclude that risk aversion doesn’t affect performance. On average, men solve significantly 
more mazes than women in mixed tournament (4.2 mazes), which is caused by dramatic 
increases in men’s performance and no significant changes in women’s performance.  
The authors list four explanations for the large gender gap in competitive environments: 1) 
Women don’t compete against men, if, for example, women think men are more adept at 
solving mazes. Stereotype threat, put forward by psychology literatures, provides additional 
support for this explanation; 2) Women just don’t compete. This might because women 
have higher costs of efforts, lower sensitivity to compensation schemes, and stronger 
aversion towards competition; 3) Men compete too much. It could due to additional utility 
men gain from winning or overconfidence.  
In order to find out the reason, the authors conduct the following two treatments in which 
participants are divided into six-people single-sex groups. In the fourth treatment, 
single-sex tournament, the performance of men is not significantly different from that in 
mixed tournament and thus not affected by the gender of their competitors. By contrast, 
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women significantly improve their performance in a single-sex competitive environment 
compare with in non-competitive environment. The gender gap in mean performance is 
somehow higher in single sex tournaments (1.7 mazes) while not significant. The increase 
in women’s performance could due to the compensation scheme, or to the absence of male 
competitors. Thus the authors use the fifth experiment, single-sex piece rate to disentangle 
these two effects. On average, women solve 10 mazes in the single-sex piece rate, 9.73 in 
the mixed piece rate, and 12.6 in single-sex tournaments. The results show that women’s 
performance increase in single-sex tournament is due to the change in compensation 
scheme rather than the absence of male competitors. 
Then the authors examine how men and women respond when moving from 
noncompetitive to competitive environments. For example, a man who solved 15 mazes in 
the noncompetitive treatments is expected to solve at least 17 mazes in the mixed 
tournament. If women receive the exactly same boost, then she would solve at least 17 
mazes in the mixed tournament if she solved 15 mazes in the noncompetitive treatments. 
By comparing the expected performance of women with actual performance of women, the 
author concludes that women improve their performance significantly less than men. The 
results provide supports to the explanation that men and women face different competitors 
as men perform better across treatments. Thus, in the following analysis, the authors find 
that for all performance levels, a woman who solved x mazes always has a higher chance of 
winning the mixed tournament than a man who solved x-1 mazes in the noncompetitive 
treatments. Therefore, the authors assume both gender receive the same boosts and 
compare the performance change of woman who solved x mazes with men who solved x-1 
mazes in the noncompetitive treatments. The expected mixed tournament performance of 
women which yield in this way, is still higher than actual performance of women in mixed 
tournaments. Hence, the poor performance of women in mixed tournaments is not solely 
because a man and a woman of same performance level behave differently in mixed 
tournaments as man faces an easier competition than the women. 
The authors consider two explanations for the differences in behaviors. First, both genders 
know little about their performance but realize the potential gender gap in ability. Second, 
women are relatively less overconfident about their ability, compare with men. Therefore, 
in the final treatment, participants are allowed to set a difficulty level of mazes after 
solving a maze of difficulty level 2. The payoff is a function of difficulty level. The mean 
chosen difficulty level is 3.4 for men and 2.6 for women, the difference is significant. Thus, 
men are overconfident and prefer challenging tasks than women. 
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Finally, the authors compare mean performance across treatments. The mean performance 
is 12.95 in mixed tournament, and 13.47 in single-sex tournament. The difference is 
insignificant. Participants perform significantly better in competitive environments than in 
noncompetitive environments. Therefore tournaments have a strong positive effect on 
performance. 
In order to find out gender differences in competition at young age, Gneezy et al. (2004) 
choose the running task instead. Participants are all fourth graders and 9-10 years old. The 
variable of interest is the speed in a 40 meter race. The experiment was conducted during a 
physical education class and the speed data is recorded by a teacher to make it like a 
normal practice in the class and prevent students from realizing they are taking part in an 
experiment. Each participants need to run twice. At first, each child runs alone. In the 
second round, students in the treatment group are paired according to their speed in the first 
round, regardless of their gender. After the match, two students run side by side. Children 
of the control group still run alone. Unlike Gneezy et al. (2003), in this paper, subjects 
know not only their own performance but also their competitors’ performance which is 
close to theirs. They find in the first round, girls outperform boys (7.672 seconds vs. 7.693 
seconds) insignificantly while in the second round, the female advantage reversed. The 
average running time of the control group decreases by 0.037 seconds and no significant 
gender gap in the improvement of performances. In contrast, the treatment group 
experiences a 0.081 second reduction in running time. However, after they divide 
improvement by gender, they find on average boys improved (-0.163 seconds) while girls 
actually slow down (+0.015 seconds). Boys benefit from the competition: the running time 
of the one who runs faster decreases by 0.182 seconds, and 0.088 seconds declination for 
another one. When girls are matched with other girls, they experience performance 
decrease. The running time increases by 0.066 seconds for the girl who performs better in 
the first round and 0.0333 seconds for the girl who performs worse in the first round. 
Gneezy et al. (2004) attribute the opposite findings to the peer pressure from the rest of 
children. 
There’re several differences between these two papers. In Gneezy et al. (2004), students are 
not aware of the field study and younger than college students, which are subjects of 
Gneezy et al. (2003). Furthermore, children have information about own and others’ 
performance while college students know nothing. Last but not least, college students 
receive monetary reward based on their show-up and performance while children only 
receive intrinsic motivation.  
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To summarize, both Gneezy et al. (2003) and Gneezy et al. (2004) support the statement 
that competition settings have positive effects on the overall performance, and the 
performance increase is larger for males. 
3.1.2 Tournament entry decision 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) use tournament entry, instead. Participants are divided into 
different groups, consist of 2 male and 2 female. The task is to add up sets of five two-digit 
numbers for five minutes without calculator. In the first two tasks, participants perform this 
addition task in the context of noncompetitive piece rate and competitive tournament, the 
only difference is the compensation scheme. In the noncompetitive piece rate, participants 
can get 50 cents for each correct answer while in the competitive tournament, only the best 
performer could be rewarded for 2 dollars per correct answer. Participants are then asked to 
select which of these two compensation schemes they would like to apply to their next 
performance. In task 3, participants who choose piece rate earn 50 cents per correctly 
solved problem. If they choose tournament and only if their performance in task-3 is better 
than the performance of their group members in task-2, they would be rewarded 2 dollars 
for each correct answer. This has several advantages: first, the performance of a player who 
enters the tournament is evaluated against the performance of other participants who also 
performed under tournament. Second, beliefs regarding the choices of others won’t affect 
the entry decision. Third, the entry decision is an individual decision problem and won’t 
impose negative externality on others since it compares with the prior performance of 
competitors. Therefore gender differences in social preferences won’t cause gender gaps in 
tournament entry.  
They put forward four possible explanations for gender differences in tournament entry 
among equally able participants: 1) Men prefer competition; 2) Men are more confident; 3) 
Men are more risk prone; 4) Men are less feedback aversion. Since individuals could 
deduce their relative performance according to the monetary reward, how they think about 
feedbacks provided by the payoffs could affect the entry decision. Niederle and Vesterlund 
(2007) consider the first explanation as preferences for performing in a competitive 
environment and the remaining three explanations as general factors. The question of 
interest is to what extent competition preferences and general factors, separately, could 
explain the gender differences in tournament entry. Therefore, in order to isolate the effect 
of general factors from that of competition preferences, they develop task 4: participants 
choose one compensation scheme that they would like to apply to their past piece-rate 
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performance in task 1 and don’t have to perform. The decision does not affect the earnings 
of any other participant, nor does it depend on the entry decisions of others. The decision of 
task 4 only affected by general factors since participants don’t need to do the task. Finally, 
participants are asked to guess their ranks in task 1 and 2. 
The mean performance is 10.15 problems for women and 10.68 for men in the piece rate. 
In the tournament, it’s 11.8 for women and 12.1 for men. In both tasks, the gender 
differences in performances and in performance improvement don’t reach significance. The 
authors attribute this performance increase to learning or tournament incentives. The 
chance of winning the tournament is 26 % for a male participant and 24 % for a female 
participant after controlling for gender only. The probability of winning is similar for each 
gender if they are equally able. Hence the authors don’t expect gender gaps in propensity of 
tournament entry. 
According to the compensation schemes of task 3, a risk neutral agent would choose to 
enter the tournament if the chance of winning is more than 25 %. If in task 3, participants 
behave exactly like what they perform in task 2, then this corresponds to participants who 
solve more than 13 problems correctly. Hence, 30 % of the women and 30 % of the men 
should enter. If include people who are indifferent between these two options, that is, 
people who solve 13 problems correctly, then 40 % of women and 45 % of men should 
enter. 
However, the actual entry ratio is strike and significantly different from the expected ratio. 
35 % of women and 73 % of men opt for the tournament. Among women who choose piece 
rate and tournament, there’s no performance difference in the Task-1, Task-2 or in 
improvement when move from Task-1 to Task-2. The performance in Task-2 is marginally 
higher for men who select the tournament (p = 0.14). When only gender, performance and 
performance increase are controlled, the results show gender has a significant and 
substantial effect. Being a woman reduce the probability of entering the tournament by 
38 %, ceteris paribus. The performance in Task-3 parallels performance in Task-2 and can’t 
explain the substantial gender gap. Participants who enter the tournament don’t have better 
past performance or improve their performance.  
Then the authors look into four quintiles according to their intergroup ranks in Task-2 and 
Task-3 and observe for each group, the performance have limited effect. For every 
performance level, men are more likely to enter the tournament. Surprisingly, the entry 
probability of the top 25 % of female participants is even lower than that of the bottom 
25 % of male participants. Risk attitudes alone are unable to explain the entry gap. As 
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mentioned above, subjects who solve more than 13 problems should enter the tournament 
as the payoff is higher. Of those participants, about two-thirds of women and only one 
fourth of men shy away from the competition. Of participants who solve less than 12 
problems, about 61 % of men and 29 % of women embrace the competition.  
There is no doubt that the over-entry of low-performing participants and under-entry of 
high-performing generate costs. After ignoring performance costs and assuming that there’s 
no correlation between performance and the chosen incentive scheme, the authors argue 
that the cost of under-entry is higher for women (99.4 dollars vs. 34.5 dollars), while the 
cost of over-entry is higher for men (32.9 vs. 56.5). Compare with over-entry, under-entry 
has higher costs which are not surprising as under-entry profits are forgone by 
high-performing participants. Women bear much higher costs. Calculations based on 
performance in Task-2 show that in total, the costs are 132.3 for women and 91.0 for men. 
Replace it with performance in Task-3 doesn’t alter the result (113.5 vs. 93.3).  
Both gender are overconfident as they expect themselves to have better ranks in Task-2, 
men are more overconfident however. Three-fourths of men and 43 % of women think they 
are the best performer of their teams. Women are significantly less confident than men (p = 
0.016). Including the guessed rank into regression close 27 % of the gender gap.  
In Task-4, subjects are required to choose one of the incentive schemes to apply to their 
performance in Task-1. In the Task-1, the chance of being the best performer is 29 % for a 
man and 21 % for a woman. Individuals who solve more than 11 problems should select 
the tournament, which refer to 30 % of women and 40 % of men. If individuals who are 
indifferent between these two inventive schemes are included, then 40 % of women and 
45 % of men should choose the tournament. However, actually 55 % of men and only 25 % 
of women decide to apply the tournament to their performance in Task-1. Again, there’s no 
performance difference between women who choose the tournament and women who 
choose the piece rate. Men who choose the tournament have significantly better 
performance than the rest who choose piece rate (12.05 vs. 9, p = 0.004). There is a 
positive association between men’s performance and the chosen incentive scheme, but not 
for women. The largest gender gap appears among participants who solve the most problem 
correctly. For participants who should choose the tournament, 75 % of women and only 
12.5 % of men made the wrong decision. For participants who have higher expected 
payoffs from the piece rate, the likelihoods of making wrong decision for both genders are 
similar. As before, both women and men are overconfident about their ranks in Task-1 and 
men are significantly more confident. Confidence has a positive effect on the probability of 
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selecting the tournament. The gender gap in tournament entry in Task-4 is insignificant 
when performance and guessed rank in Task-1 and female dummy are included. Therefore, 
the authors argue that risk attitudes and feedback aversion only play negligible roles.  
Controlling for the dummy which indicate the participant choose the piece rate in Task-4 or 
not, the authors find that subjects who select the tournament in Task-4 are significantly 
more likely to enter the tournament in Task-3, but the gender gap remains. Being a woman 
reduce the odd of choosing the tournament by 16 %.  
The authors allege that the effects of gender on competition should be treated with caution. 
First, factors such as risk attitudes and feedback aversion may have greater impact when 
people need to compete with others. Thus Task-4 may only capture part of effects and the 
results overestimate the importance of competition preference. Second, result would be 
upward biased if men are more optimistic about their future performance. The guessed 
ranks not only demonstrate how confident the participant is, but also show how the 
participant perceives past success/failure. If women attribute their past success to luck 
rather than individual ability while men do the opposite, the study would exaggerate the 
impact of willingness to compete.  
To summarize, 57 % of the original gender gap can be explained by general factors 
(confidence, risk attitudes and feedback aversion). Competition preferences, which means 
men and women have different preferences when perform in a competitive environment, 
contribute to the residual 43 % of the gap. The low probability of choosing to compete not 
only reduces the number of women who enter tournaments, but also the number of female 
winners in the competition.  
3.1.3 Link two approaches 
Niederle (2011) argue that both approach describe similar phenomena, especially if we 
consider high performance in a competitive environment as the decision to work hard. 
Hence, the two approaches would lead to the same conclusion that men are more 
competitive than women. However, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) select a task in which 
performance is independent of the chosen compensation scheme. Further studies should 
build connection between these two approaches and assess for women whose performance 
in a competitive context does not fully reflect their piece-rate performance, would they 
avoid competition. 
Saccardo et al. (2018) introduce a new procedure in order to measure the size of 
competitiveness. The authors argue that the tournament entry could be seen as extensive 
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margin, while to what extent the earnings depend on tournament could be viewed as 
intensive margin and then examine them separately. In the extensive margin treatment, 
participants who choose piece rate would earn 1 dollar for each successful toss. For 
participants who choose the tournament, he would be paired and only if he outperforms 
another opponent could he earn 3 dollars for each successful toss. In the intensive margin 
treatment, participants need to pin down the composition of their payoffs: the participant 
would receive 100 points and assign t points to the tournament. If the participant wins the 
tournament, then the payoff would be (100-t+3t) per successful toss; if the participant loses, 
the monetary reward for each successful toss is 100-t. The greater share the participant 
invests in the tournament, the more competitive the participant is. Hence this original 
design enables the authors to determine 101 levels of competitiveness rather than just the 
binary measure. In both treatments, decisions need to be made before performing the task 
and then perform ball-tossing tasks ten times.  
In the extensive margin treatment, in line with Gneezy et al. (2003), men outperform 
women in the competitive context. 32.4 % of female participants enter the tournament 
while the number is 78.2 % for men, a substantial and significant gender gap. Without any 
controls, women are 36.4 % less likely to participate in the tournament. Adding the variable 
which indicates the sex ratio widens the gap to 39.9 %. In line with Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007), each gender is overconfident and men are more confident than women 
about their expected successful toss (5.79 vs. 4.51) and the expected probability of winning 
(63.13 % vs. 43.29 %). Adding the expected chance of winning to the model decreases the 
gender gap by 9 % while the expected successful toss and risk attitudes only have 
negligible effects. 
In the intensive margin, on average, 50.11 points are allocated to the tournament. Women 
devote 35.27 points whereas men devote 66.43 points, the allocation decision significantly 
differs by gender. The cumulative distribution function depicts the gender differences in 
allocate decision more evident: the distribution for male participants is visibly shifted to the 
right. The most competitive 25 % of female participants invest over 50 points in the 
tournament, while only the least competitive 25 % of male participants invest fewer than 50 
points. The median points are 70 for male participants however the most competitive 
woman only invests 80 points. Without any controls, female participants allocate 31.15 
points fewer than men. Adding the sex ratio to the model doesn’t alter the result, which 
suggests gender composition affects both gender similarly. Still, both men and women are 
overconfident and men are significantly more confident about their expected performance 
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(5.75 vs. 4.28) and the expected probability of winning (65.15 % vs. 43.70 %). Adding the 
expected chance of winning to the model decreases the gender gap in allocation decision by 
14.66 points, which closes 45 % of the gap. However, the gender gap remains significant. 
The expected performance and risk attitudes only have negligible effects.  
Then the authors compare extensive margin with intensive margin. For the extensive 
margin treatment, the female-to-male ratio means divide the ratio of female participants 
who choose the tournament out of all women by the ratio of males who choose the 
tournament out of all men. For the intensive margin treatment, the female-to-male ratio 
corresponds to the ratio of female participants to male participants who allocate more than 
certain points. The authors observe that among participants whose allocated points are 
fewer than median points, the female-to-male ratio is almost same in two treatments, which 
is 0.41 to 1. The upper tail of the distribution however differs. The women-to-men ratio 
reduces to 0.09 among the most competitive 25% of participants and become 0 at the top 
10% of participants because they are all men. There are correlations between confidence 
and risk attitudes and the likelihoods of the subject among the most competitive 25% and 
confidence alone could explain whether individuals are in the least competitive 25% of the 
sample. However, risk attitudes and confidence are unable to account for the gender gap of 
the whole distribution.  
From the threshold of tournament entry perspective, 32.4% of women participate in the 
tournament in the extensive margin treatment while about 32% of women assign over 45 
points to the tournament, hence the authors consider 45 points as the cutoff points for 
women to enter the tournament. Similarly, the cutoff point for men is 40 points as in the 
extensive margin treatment, approximately 78% of men enter the tournament while 77.5% 
of men assign over 40 points to the tournament. Therefore, both gender face similar cutoff 
point when make the entry decision and gender differences in competition preference are 
driven by the different distribution of competitiveness level.  
To conclude, the in-or-out tournament entry dummy fails to capture the competitiveness 
level among highly competitive people. The linear measure (intensive margin), instead, 
shows that the ratio of women among the most competitive participants is even smaller 
than what is estimated by the extensive margin treatment. If candidates for well-paid jobs 
are mainly drawn from the pool of highly competitive individuals, then the 
underrepresentation at the top of the distribution could explain the dramatic gender gap in 
the real world to some degree. This gap could emerge at the start of career path. Therefore, 
the novel measure not only offers a more precise method for measuring the intensity of 
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competitiveness level and for estimating the magnitude of the gender differences among 
different percentiles, but also allows for deeper investigation into gender pay gap in real 
world. The methodological advantage is that it requires fewer subjects for a determined 
power level to reject a null hypothesis.  
3.2 Affecting Factors 
By analyzing possible affecting factors, we could have a better understanding of 
competition preferences, how it works, would it be nature or nurture, if there are gender 
differences when competition preferences come into effect and hence put forward policies 
aimed at closing the gender gap. Also, would institutions, both in the real world and in the 
lab itself, has an impact on competitiveness?  
3.2.1 Biological Factors 
Buser (2012) explores the role played by hormone in competition preferences. The 28-day 
menstrual cycle is categorized into five phases and therefore subjects are assigned to one of 
five groups according to the phase they are experiencing. The author states that that the 
hormone level and the use of hormonal contraceptives have strongly and significantly 
negative effects on women’s entry decisions but not on confidence, risk attitudes and 
performance in a competitive environment.  
In contrast, Wozniak et al. (2014) find women whose hormone levels are high enter the 
tournament more often than those who have low hormone levels. Except differences in 
experimental designs and participants6, Buser (2012) argues that in Wozniak et al. (2014), 
entry decisions may depend on factors which are related to hormone levels but have 
nothing to do with competition preferences.  
3.2.2 Culture 
Gneezy et al. (2009) compare the Maasai tribe in Tanzania, which is patriarchal and the 
Khasi tribe in India, which is a matrilineal society. Gneezy et al. (2009) classify the Khasi 
as a female-dominated society and list several features: 1) Inheritance and clan membership 
always follow the female lineage through the youngest daughter; 2) Women usually live in 
separate households which next to their families, thus they never join their husbands’ 
households; 3) Women make the majority of household decisions while men assume 
                                                        
6 Subjects in Buser (2012) are all women while subjects perform in a mixed-sex context in Wozinak et al. (2014).  
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responsibilities that similar to those of women in male-dominated societies; 4) Families 
could keep the investment of raising girls in their households thus have the freedom to raise 
the daughter at will. Contrary to Khasi, the status of Maasai men depends on their ages and 
the number of cattle they have. The most common type of marriage is polygamy.  
In the experimental task, subjects are required to throw a tennis ball into a bucket which is 
3 meters away ten times. The authors argue the unfamiliarity toward tasks guarantees that 
traditional skills won’t lead to male advantages, thus results could provide insights into 
competitive inclinations. Participants are divided into two groups and know they would 
compete with a person from another group simultaneously. However, participants don’t 
know the identity of their competitors. Before performing the task, participants need to pin 
down the compensation schemes, whether to be paid by piece rate or by tournament.  
Results show there is no gender gap in success rates in each society. About 50 % of 
subjects in the Khasi decide to compete, while the number is 39 % in the Maasai. As 
expected, male in the Maasai are more likely to opt for competition as 50 % of men and 
26 % of women choose to competition. In the Khasi, 54 % of female participants select to 
compete, which is even slightly higher than the ratio of Maasai men and 39 % of Khasi 
men made the same decision. The authors rule out the possibility of biological evolution 
and attribute the gender gaps to the culture.  
Even though participants don’t know the gender of their competitors, they can deduce by 
observing the gender composition of their own group. Hence, the authors use four ways to 
control the effect of gender composition. First, the author includes a dummy variable (male 
= 1) that represent the gender of the one who stands in front of the person. The second 
variable is the arithmetic average of the gender of two participants who stands in front of 
and behind the subjects. The third variable is about the 4 nearest subjects and the fourth is 
about the 8 nearest subjects. The fifth is about all others in the group. They argue that if 
subjects make deduction according to the gender composition of their own group, then, 
overall, women are inclined to compete against other women, especially in the Khasi, the 
matrilineal societies. 
Anderson et al. (2013) follow the experimental design developed by Gneezy et al.(2009) 
closely and replicate the results among 13-15 years old kids. They recruit subjects who live 
in Meghalaya, India but belong to different tribes to eliminate possible biological factors 
such as genetic distance. They don’t observe gender differences in competition in the 
matrilineal society while girls in patriarchal society show a significantly strong aversion 
toward competition (67 % vs. 19 %).  
  21 
Based on papers list above, we can see that culture does shape people’s competitiveness to 
some extent. Moreover, it seems to be straightforward to draw the conclusion that more 
gender equal society would have smaller gender differences in competition. However, some 
papers, in which results are counterintuitive, deserve more attention.  
Cárdenas et al. (2012) compare Swedish children with Colombian children of same age, 
and surprisingly, they find that Colombian boys and girls are equally competitive across 
tasks and mixed results in Sweden, despite of its much higher gender equality index. There 
are in total four tasks: running, skipping ropes, math and verbal tasks. Competitiveness 
when perform running and skipping ropes tasks are measured by performance change, 
while in math and verbal tasks is additionally measured by tournament entry. Swedish girls 
experience greater improvements in rope-skipping and math tasks. Speaking of choices, 
44 % of Swedish boys and only 19 % of Swedish girls select to compete in math, 
difference is significant at 1 % level, whereas the entry rates of verbal task are 39 % for 
Swedish boys and 27 % for Swedish girls (p = 0.045). The gender of opponent only plays a 
role when Colombian girls and Swedish boys perform running tasks, both of them benefit 
from female opponents. They explore the attitudes towards these tasks, the scores range 
from 0, completely feminine to 10, completely masculine. Generally, children in both 
countries consider math and running tasks are significantly more masculine whereas 
rope-skipping and verbal tasks are more girlish. They also ask student how important it is 
to compete against boys and girls. In both countries, boys attach much more value to 
competition as than girls. In Colombia, both girls and boys believe that it is more important 
to compete against a boy than against a girl. Girls in Sweden rate competing against a boy 
as being more important compared to competing against a girl, whereas boys are indifferent 
to whom they are going to compete with. 
Dariel et al.(2017) focus on the a minority group, Emirati in the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE henceforth), a traditionally male-dominated society but currently experiencing a 
transition as it has enforced a number of policies to empower women recently. Therefore, 
their sample is composed of college students who were kids when some of supportive 
policies were introduced and the average age is 22.5-year-old. Participants know their 
individual performance and whether they would compete in a single-sex or a mixed group. 
Overall there are gender differences in performance across tasks: men solve 36.1 % more 
problems in the piece rate task, 38.1 % more in the tournament task, 22.0 % more in the 
choice task, all significant at p value < 0.001. The gender composition impacts 
performance in neither task 1 nor task 2. Only in task 3, when participants are able to 
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choose incentive schemes, men in mixed group significantly outperform men in single-sex 
group (17.63 vs 15.00). The raw female tournament entry rate is 4 % higher than that of 
male (54.3 % vs. 50.0 %) while insignificant. The gap widens and reaches significance 
once control for tournament performance, performance increase, risk aversion and 
overconfidence. Women behave similarly no matter what kind of groups they are assigned 
to. Contrarily, men in single-sex group are 12.6 % less likely to enter tournament than men 
in mixed-group.  
Zhang (2019) compare ethnic groups live in one Chinese county: Patriarchal Yi and 
Matrilineal Mosuo. Even there’s no significant gender difference in the likelihood of 
winning the tournament for the Yi and the Mosuo, the author find substantial gender 
differences in raw tournament entry rates. The Yi men are 23 % more likely and the Mosuo 
men are 28 % more likely to enter the tournament.  
3.2.3 Institutions 
Both Dariel et al.(2017) and Zhang (2019) adopt the approach put forward by Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007) but fail to find competition distaste for female who live in patriarchal 
society. Dariel et al. (2017) state that results may be partly driven by institutional changes 
happened in recent years. Zhang (2019) provide supports for the argument. If institutions 
help explain gender differences in competition, then this offers a prospective for different 
results in developing and advanced countries, since developing countries are still at an 
early stage of development and more politically volatile.  
From 1949, China launched several institutional reforms, which is characterized by 
covering broadly, from economy to education, from employment to social norms. A series 
of reforms set the minimum age for marriage, grant women the right to divorce, extricate 
women from unpaid household production and enable them to enter labor markets, etc. On 
the one hand, Han Chinese, the ethnic majority are exposed to reforms. On the other hand, 
due to political reasons, ethnic minority groups who live in mainland China and work in 
non-public sectors were exempted from the reforms starts in 1949, even though they 
experienced institutional changes several decades later while Taiwanese are exempted from 
the communist reforms completely and still exposed to traditional Confucian ideology. 
Hence, China serves as a good example to provide insights about the effects of institutions.  
Zhang (2019) look into three different ethnicities: patriarchal Han and Yi and matrilineal 
Mosuo. Mosuo child automatically became a member of the mother’s family. Unlike the 
Khasi bribe, the head of household could be male but each family member has control over 
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his or her labor income and is able to join the important household decisions. Mosuo 
society is a monogamous society, which differs from traditional Han and Yi society. The 
author observe no gender differences in performance for Yi and Mosuo, and Han Chinese 
men outperform only marginally significant at 13% level. Also, when move from piece-rate 
to tournament, there are no gender or ethnic differences in performance changes. To be 
more specific, all three ethnicities don’t improve their performance under the competitive 
context. Without any controls, men from all 3 groups are more inclined to enter the 
tournament. The raw gender gap in tournament entry rates are 15% for Han, 23% for Yi 
and 28% for the Mosuo. The gap for the Yi and the Mosuo persists after controlling for 
overconfidence and risk attitudes, while the gap for the Han lose its significance after 
condition on overconfidence.  
The author contends that differences in competition aren’t caused by socio-economic status, 
educational level or one child policy. Instead, the difference in the gender gap in 
competitiveness between the Han Chinese and the Yi is mainly due to national marriage 
law, and particularly the enacted greater marriage autonomy and delayed marriage. Mosuo 
women compete as equally as Han Chinese woman, which indicates that culture doesn’t 
generate an additional effect compare with compulsory regulation, whereas Mosuo men 
enter the tournament significantly more than the Han Chinese men, possibly because 
Mosuo has a unique way of marriages and Mosuo male enjoy higher returns to competitive 
behavior. 
Booth et al. (2019) not only compare Taiwanese with mainland Chinese, but also compare 
people of different generations. In 1978, China started to transit from central planning to 
market economy and Marxist ideology fade out due to the immeasurable damage caused in 
the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and the influx of individualistic and money-oriented 
ideology. The Cultural Revolution put a lot of emphasis on gender equality, shown in the 
high frequency of relevant words that appeared in ‘People’s Daily’, the official CCP7 
newspaper. The treatment group consists of three groups: (1) individuals born in 1958 thus 
receive primary education during the Cultural Revolution complete; (2) individuals born in 
1966 thus are partially exposed to the Cultural Revolution and the market economy; (3) 
individuals born in 1977, thus grow up in an economic reform era. As expected, Chinese 
women show stronger willingness to compete than Taiwanese women. Chinese women 
who are born in 1958 are more competitive compare with male of same age and the two 
younger groups. They don’t find gender or generation gaps in competiveness among 
                                                        
7 Chinese Communist Party. 
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Taiwanese.  
There’re concerns that Taiwanese and minority groups who work in non-public sectors are 
more or less affected by the reform, which could be true especially for minority groups 
since there are no visible segregation. The problem is less severe when compare with 
Taiwanese and Chinese due to geographic location8 and political factors9. 
3.2.4 Socioeconomic status 
Almas et al. (2015) conduct the Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) experiment among 9th 
grade Norwegian students. In general, boys are much more willing to select to competition 
(51.6 % vs. 32.2 %). Interestingly, there are no gender gap in confidence, risk preference, 
social preference and family backgrounds. A low SES family is defined as the family that is 
in the bottom 20 % of both the income and education distributions in the sample. Only 
23.1 % of children from Low SES family enter the tournament while the number for 
children from medium and high SES family is 46.9 %. Controlling for performance closes 
24.2 % of the entry gap. 
Family background has a strong and highly significant negative impact on the competition 
preferences of boys from low SES families but not for girls. The coefficient on boys is 
26.6 % and 2.4 % on girls. The effects on boys remain even take confidence, probability of 
winning, social preferences, personality traits and risk attitudes into account. The negative 
effects are due to the strong association between father’s SES and sons’ competition 
preferences. The possible explanation maybe that medium and high SES fathers spend 
more time with their sons during their crucial developmental age and, meantime, serve as 
role models.  
Findings of Almas et al. (2015) could explain the counterintuitive results of Cárdenas et al. 
(2012), that the gender differences in Colombian children are smaller than Swedish 
children, to some degrees. In the Scandinavian countries, fathers are allowed and 
encouraged to spend more time and engage more in parenting. In the more gender equal 
societies, the father plays a more important role in the offspring personality traits. The 
gender gap in competitiveness only appear among children from medium and high SES 
families, which shed lights on papers which conduct studies in developing countries and 
                                                        
8 As Taiwan is an inland, it’s much harder for interaction and communication. 
9 On 19 May 1949, the governors of Taiwan announce the Taiwan marital law would be imposed from 20 May 1949. The 
law strictly forbids and severely punishes the spread of communism-related information and any kinds of cross-traits 
exchange, particularly direct links of mail, air and shipping services, and trade. The law is abolished in 15 July 1987 but 
the earliest communication starts from 1994. Therefore Taiwanese samples in Booth et al. (2019) are expected to be 
unaffected by the reform almost completely. 
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usually observe no gender differences.  
Bartling et al. (2012) find a similar pattern among German preschoolers. Participants are 
asked to throw toy frogs into a toy pond and opt to be paid by piece rate or tournament. 
However, in this analysis, family background comes into effect via health issues, which 
strongly and negatively impacts the willingness to compete of boys from low SES family 
whereas doesn’t kick in for boys from high SES families.  
By contrast, Khadjavi et al. (2018) find a reverse association among 3-6 years old German 
children. Preschoolers are required to perform running task but have the freedom to choose 
who he/she is going to compete with. If the participant chooses to compete with others, 
then he would win a large reward plus a small reward or nothing. If the participant select 
self-competition, he would get a large reward if he succeed or a small reward if he loses. 
Results show that children from low SES family are more willing to compete, which is due 
to parents’ ambition. Parents’ ambition is measured by the extent they agree that “success is 
based on hard work” and the value they attached to the future job (both professional and 
sports) success of their kids. Ambitious parents, however, earn less and have lower 
education levels. Children of ambitious parents choose to compete even though the odd of 
winning is thin and actually better off if they change their decisions. In this analysis, 
neither age nor gender influences the competition decisions. Indeed, children whose parents 
are less ambitious obtain more rewards.  
At first glance, the results of Almas et al. (2015) and Khadjavi et al. (2018) contradict with 
each other. However, the findings of Almas et al. (2015) could be seen as a consequence of 
findings of Khadjavi et al.(2018): low SES children overinvest in competition which result 
in a waste of effort in the early stage. The past failure may be detrimental in the long run 
and hence lead children of low SES families avoid competition after they grow up.  
3.2.5 Age 
Flory et al. (2018) explore how competitiveness level changes with age. They simulate the 
four-round experimental design of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) but the task is modified 
as to arrange shapes in a row according to the size. Participants have no idea about other 
competitors in their groups. They first conduct the experiment in Malawi, a sub-Saharan 
African country. They recruit more than 700 subjects which span a broad age range and are 
gender-balanced. They include a dummy intentionally which indicate whether the subject is 
younger or older than 50-year-old, as in general women at this age have experienced 
menopause symptoms and hormone may have effects on competitiveness (Wozniak et al., 
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2014; Buser 2012). The raw gender difference in tournament entry of the whole Malawi 
sample is significant but relatively small. After controlling for age and gender together, 
they find the gender gap is driven by the youth, who have a similar gap like subjects of 
other papers, and disappears in the elderly. On the one hand, older men are not significantly 
different from younger men, whereas older women are significantly more competitive than 
younger men and have similar competition preferences as older and younger men. Being 
female could reduce the likelihoods of tournament entry by 10.5 percentage points while 
being age 50 or older is strong enough to close the gender gap in competitiveness(the 
coefficient: +0.141). On the other hand, for female subjects, risk preferences or feedback 
aversion doesn’t increase with age. Later on, they conduct the same experiment in the 
United States intended to test external validity and find similar results except competition 
preference is not significant in the full sample. 
It’s equally important to figure out when the gender gap emerges which could help 
researchers get a better grasp of the source and provide a guide for policymakers when 
devise policies. 
Sutter et al. (2010) examine this problem among 1035 3-18 years old Austrian. 717 of them 
who are over 8 are required to perform the math tasks and the younger children would 
perform running tasks. They find that across the whole age spectrum, boys are more 
competitive, measured by either  performance increase or tournament entry, than girls 
even condition on risk aversion and confidence, hence summarize that gender gap emerges 
at an early stage of life, as young as 3-year-old.  
By contrast, Khachatryan et al. (2015) investigate the gender gap in Armenia, a form Soviet 
Union country. Participants are 7-15 years old and asked to perform running, rope-skipping, 
math and verbal task. Armenia is still dominated by matrilineal kinship system despite of 
the encouragement and support for women when Armenia belongs to Soviet Union. Results 
show that boys and girls compete equally in rope-skipping, math and verbal tasks in the 
terms of performance changes while girls improve more than boys did in the running task. 
There are no gender differences in tournament entry when students are offered two 
payment options in math and verbal tasks. They choose grade 7 specifically as children of 
this age hit their puberty. They don’t find any associations between the competitiveness 
level and age.  
Andersen et al. (2013) examine the gender gap among 7-15 years old children in 
matrilineal and patriarchal villages in northeast India. They consider age 13 as the starting 
age of puberty. In both contexts, among children who aged 7-12, boys are more competitive 
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than girls (patriarchal: 2 %, matrilineal: 6 %), but neither gender nor society difference is 
significant. However, gender differences emerge around puberty. On the one hand, older 
boys who live in patriarchal villages become more competitive (increase from 46 % to 
67 %) while older girls become less competitive (decrease from 44 % to 19 %), a gender 
gap which is similar to the commonly found gap in adults and hence may reflect the mixed 
effects of culture and biological changes. On the other hand, boys and girls from 
matrilineal society compete equally across age despite the reversed gender gap (9 %) 
among children who are over 13. Older girls in matrilineal society exhibit a significantly 
higher propensity to compete than their female counterpart in patriarchal society (50 % vs. 
19 %). Results are still robust when replace the age 13 with age 12 or 14. Unlike 
Khachatryan et al. (2015), Andersen et al. (2013) suggest that policies which aim to close 
the gender gap should target children around the age of puberty to generate the most 
effective effects. 
However, studies which compare the competitiveness level of people at different ages are 
subject to several problems. First, life experiences help shape competition preference. 
Hence the effects of age may be overestimated. Second, the potential selection effects 
which caused by participants.   
3.2.6 Personality 
As competition preference is one kind of personality traits, there are some papers talk about 
the relationship between personality and competitiveness. 
Bartling et al. (2009) find a significant negative association between egalitarian preferences 
and competition preferences. Egalitarian preferences are motivated by behindness aversion 
(aversion to negative payoff inequality) and aheadness aversion (aversion to positive payoff 
inequality).  
Social preferences are elicited by four simple binary choices which is a combination of the 
participant’s income and the opponent’s income. For example, in the pro-sociality game, 
participants need to choose between (10, 10) and (10, 6), the former number represents 
monetary incentives for the participant while the latter is for the opponent. The options in 
the costly pro-sociality game are (10, 10) and (16, 4). Therefore, in this two game, 
participants need to select between egalitarian and egotistic decisions. However, compare 
with pro-sociality game, the costly pro-sociality impose financial burden on participants if 
he/she prefer equal pay. Subjects who select the egalitarian options in these two games 
would be categorized as aheadness averse. Payoffs in the envy game are (10, 10) and (10, 
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18) and in the costly envy game are (10, 10) and (11, 19), the second option, now, favors 
the opponent. The decision-maker could choose to decrease the opponent’s income and 
only incur the cost in the costly envy game. Subjects who select the egalitarian options in 
these two games would be categorized as behindness averse. For people who choose 
egalitarian options over the four games, they would be classified as egalitarian. 
In this paper, competition preferences are elicited by using the approach of Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007). Results show the probability of tournament entry is 55 % for egalitarian 
subjects and 72 % for non-egalitarian subjects, significant with p-value of 0.06. The chance 
of entering is 55 % for aheadness averse participants, in contrast, the number for subjects 
who select the unequal payoffs at least once in the pro-sociality and costly pro-sociality 
games is 87 % (p < 0.01). The odd of tournament entry is 59 % for behindness averse 
participants while 67 % for subjects who choose the unequal payoffs at least once in the 
envy and costly envy game. The gap is not significant (p = 0.46). 
Using probit models, the author find that being equalitarian reduces the probability of 
tournament entry by 30 percentage points, ceteris paribus. This effect is mainly driven by 
aheadness averse subjects while there’s no association between behindness averse and 
self-selection into competition. Not surprisingly, being risk-averse and unconfident also 
decreases the chance of self-selection into the competition, but the magnitude is much 
smaller than that of aheadness averse. Finally, they take the Big Five into consideration and 
argue that subjects scoring high in Agreeableness are less likely to enter the competition. 
Similarly, Balafoutas et al. (2012) examine the association between distributional 
preferences and competitive preferences and select the Niederle and Vesterlund’s approach 
to measure willingness to compete. The focus on this paper is the elicitation of 
distributional preferences. Each participant faces with ten binary choices which need them 
to determine how to allocate money between self and another person. The ten questions are 
classified as two types: disadvantageous inequality block and advantage inequality block. 
There’s always an egalitarian option in each questions, that is, both the participant and the 
opponent could get two euro. The non-egalitarian options of disadvantageous 
(advantageous) inequality block offer the opponent constant monetary reward, 2.6 euro (1.4 
euro) whereas payoffs of the participant are 1.6, 1.8, 2, 2.2, 2.4 euro, respectively. Hence in 
each block, a profit-oriented agent switches at most once and only in a direction from the 
egalitarian to the egalitarian allocation. In the disadvantageous inequality block, the 
decision maker would be considered benevolent if he/she starts to choose the unequal 
payoff option in the third question or earlier. Otherwise the decision maker would be 
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classified as malevolent subjects. In the advantageous inequality block, the decision-maker 
would be considered benevolent if he/she switches to the asymmetric allocation in the 
fourth question or later. Otherwise the decision maker would be classified as malevolent 
subjects. Participants who are benevolent in both blocks are referred to as efficiency loving, 
participants who are malevolent in both blocks are called spiteful, participants who are 
benevolent when advantaged, but malevolent in the disadvantageous block are classified 
inequality averse, participants who is benevolent when lag behind but malevolent in the 
advantageous block are inequality loving. 
As expected, women are 26.1 % less likely to enter the tournament. Men are more likely to 
perceive themselves as winners of the tournament than women (49 % vs. 19 %, p < 0.001) 
despite of the similar probability of winning (47.7 % vs. 46.3 %). This is caused by women 
whose performance is above median are strongly underconfident. However, there’s no 
gender difference in the distribution of social preferences. Of 132 participants, 49 male and 
45 female participants are efficiency loving, 9 males and 12 females are inequality averse 
whereas 7 males and 10 females are spiteful. No one is consistent with the definition of 
inequality loving.  
When perform under piece rate, on average, spiteful and efficiency loving participants have 
similar performance (5.78 vs. 5.76) while inequality averse participants perform slightly 
worse, only solve 4.95 questions correctly. There are no differences in performance. 
Therefore, the types of distributional preferences only have little effects when subjects 
perform in a non-competitive context. 
When move from piece rate to tournament, spiteful people solve two questions more 
correctly, while the performance improvement is about 1 for inequality averse subjects and 
only about 0.6 for efficiency-minded people. Spiteful people improve significantly more 
than efficiency lovers (p < 0.05) and marginally significant than inequality averse subjects 
(p < 0.1). 71 % of spiteful subjects, 47 % of efficiency-oriented subjects and only 29 % of 
inequality averse win the tournament.  
When participants are able to selection between two incentive schemes, 28.6 % of 
inequality averse and 29.4 % of spiteful subjects decide to enter competition. 
Efficiency-oriented people enter much more often, the entry rate is 51 %.  
It’s intriguing that spiteful subjects shy away from competition despite of the much higher 
success rate. The authors argue it doesn’t result from the low confidence level of spiteful 
subjects. Hence, the behaviors of spiteful subjects seem to be deliberate considering their 
preferences and correct beliefs about individual performance rather than a mistake caused 
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by biased expectations. 
Those two papers are closely related with each other, even though name types of 
other-regarding preferences differently. In Balafoutas et al. (2012), benevolent in the 
advantageous inequality block could be seen as an aheadness averse action while 
malevolent in the disadvantageous inequality block could be seen as a behindness averse 
action. Therefore, compare with Bartling et al. (2009), Balafoutas et al. (2012) have 
different findings that aversion to be left behind rather than be high-performing participants 
plays a more role in entry decision. The difference results could due to several reasons: 
First, the sample pools of Bartling et al. (2009) are German preschoolers while in 
Balafoutas et al. (2012) participants are all college students. Second, Bartling et al. (2009) 
don’t require participants to perform under piece rate or tournament. Participants make 
choices after they experience a practice round. The way participants make decisions itself 
could lead to differences in self-selection into competition. Finally these two papers use 
different ways to elicit social preferences. Thus, this line of research just gets started. 
3.2.7 Stereotype threat 
As researches listed above shows, in some tasks it’s harder to detect gender differences. 
Also, males and females perceive a given task differently (Cárdenas et al. (2012)). 
Women’s performance could be task-dependent. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) maintain 
that men and women perform similarly in arithmetic or algebra despite the better 
performance of men in abstract math problems. Stereotype threat, according to the 
definition of Steele and Aronson (1995), refer to the concern generated from a situation 
where an agent worried about his/her self-characteristics would confirm a negative 
stereotype about his/her social group. Even minor manipulations could activate stereotype 
threat and negatively affect performance. Therefore, some papers alter tasks to investigate 
the effects of stereotypes about a given tasks on competition preference.  
Iriberri et al. (2017) requires all participants to perform each tasks twice, first under 
piece-rate and then under the tournament. In the tournament, participants would be 
matched with an equally able competitor, measured by performance in piece rate. 
Participants only know the matching protocol after they finish performing under piece rate. 
The reasons for the pair-wise tournament are that the competition between people of 
similar performance enables to determine the pure impact of competition on all participants. 
Also this eliminates the effect of gender differences in beliefs about ability. There are 8 
treatments. Subjects in the Control groups received no information before they participated 
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in the tournament. The remaining participants are told different information according to 
the groups they are assigned to. The details are shown in Figure 8. 
 
  Figure 8: Timeline of the experiment 
The experimental tasks are the focus of this kind of research, therefore are chosen 
according to the meta-analysis of Psychology literature on gender differences in 
performance in the absence of incentives. Men are believed to outperform women in spatial 
tasks while women are perceived to have advantages in verbal and memory tasks. 
Therefore, they choose a mental rotation task (MRT) as the ‘male task’ and a symbol digit 
substitution task (SDST) as the ‘female task’. In the MRT, participants need to answer 
whether the figures are identical after seeing three-dimensional figures. In the SDST, 
subjects have to translate the three-letter sequences into numbers according to information 
which show the letters and the corresponding number. The survey which reveals how 
participants perceive these two tasks confirms the expectation of the authors. Compare with 
men, Women are more likely to view SDST as a female-favoring task whereas men and 
women are equal likely to view MRT as a male-favoring task. In this paper, whether a task 
favors (wo)men or not depends on the perceptions rather than actual performance. Overall, 
male participants perform significantly better in MRT while there is no gender difference in 
performance in SDST. In MRT, the average improvement is 5.23 when move from piece 
rate to tournament. The improvement is significant in three treatments: Competitor’s 
Gender (coefficient: -6.4810), Ability Differences and Competitor’s Gender (coefficient: 
-4.557) and Competitor Ready (coefficient: -4.655). Compare with the control group, 
revealing competitor’s gender boosts men’s performance improvements by 75 % in the 
                                                        
10 The coefficients list here indicate the interactions between female and specific treatment.  
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tournament (8.4 vs. 4.77), while women’s performance increase is reduced by about 50 % 
(3.13 vs. 5.76). In SDST there are no gender differences in performance improvement 
across treatment.  
The findings suggest that when compete with someone who is in favorable position, 
women are more likely to prone to underperform when pre-existing negative thoughts are 
primed by revealing the identity or existence of competitors. The information provided 
before starting competition is crucial. In this case, policymakers should be cautious and try 
to correct the wrong previous perception about women’s relatively lower productivity at 
jobs which are normally considered as favor men. 
There are some other papers find similar patterns. Wieland and Sarin (2012) find gender 
differences in tournament entry as a whole are not significant (46 % for men and 45 % for 
women). However, they do find gender differences in some tasks. In this paper, subjects are 
required to answer quizzes cover four subjects and decide whether to be paid by piece rate 
or the tournament. Subjects are categorized into male-favoring (Math), female-favoring 
(Fashion), gender-neutral (Verbal and Crafts). As expected, women have significantly 
higher propensity of selecting the tournament when it comes to Fashion (26 % vs. 46 %) 
and men and women have the same entry rate in Craft (47 %). Contrary to expectation, 
there are no gender differences in tournament entry in Math (48 % vs. 45 %) and men enter 
the tournament more often then women in Verbal (62 % vs. 42 %). Familiarity about the 
certain subject and self-perception about competition are two key determinants of entry 
decision. Greater familiarity results in better performance. The authors also measure how 
important competition is for participants to gain a sense of self-worth.  
Günther et al. (2010) argue that men also shy away from competition in area which they 
think they would lose, even though to a lower degree. They argue the task in Gneezy et al. 
(2003) favors male, so they also organize a neutral task(write words start with a given letter) 
and female task(memorize and answer). The results of the male task (maze) are in line with 
Gneezy et al. (2003). When solve mazes under piece rate, compare with the average 
absolute performance, women solve 10.4 % fewer while men solve 1.7 % more, the gender 
difference in performance is not significant. When solve mazes under the tournament, 
women solve 9.5 % fewer while men solve 20.1 % more. The performance increase is 
insignificant for women and only marginally significant for men (p = 0.077). Hence, men 
improve their performance under competitive environment when perform a male tasks. 
When perform the neutral task, consistent with expectation, men and women react similarly 
to the competitive pressure, measured by absolute performance and performance 
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improvement. The results of the female task are a little tricky. The female tasks ask 
participants to memorize short descriptions and then answer questions based on the given 
material. However, there’s a distraction task between this two stages, which require 
participants to distinguish the different picture from the remaining several times. Men and 
women perform almost identically in the memory task and the gender differences are 
actually driven by the distraction task. Therefore the further studies need to proceed 
carefully as women indeed perform worse than men in the memory task, which is supposed 
to favor women. Contrary to expectation, both gender perform worse under competitive 
pressure, which may explained by the efforts put into the distraction task. The authors 
conclude that women may suffer double-stereotype threat: first, it’s inappropriate for a 
woman to being competitive. Second, the male settings may impose a negative stigma on 
women as it makes gender salient. 
Balafoutas et al. (2018) examine the effect of priming policy on gender gap. Participants 
are randomly assigned to one of three treatments: Neutral, High-power or Low-power 
priming treatment. All participants are required to perform a calculation task in 4-people 
groups which designed to measure competition preference. Additionally, before the 
calculation task, the High-power priming (HIGH) treatment asks subjects to describe a 
personal experience about control other people while the Low-power priming (LOW) 
treatment asks subject to describe a personal experience about being controlled by others. 
After finish writing, participants need to rate how powerful they feel they are on a scale 
from 1 (absolutely powerless) to 9 (absolutely powerful). On average, subjects in HIGH 
(6.22) consider themselves much more powerful than subjects in LOW (3.41). There’s no 
gender difference in self-perception in LOW (3.43 vs. 3.38) and HIGH (6.16 vs. 6.29).  
There’re three stages: piece rate, tournament, choice. At the end of each stage, participants 
are told about their individual performance. Only men in Neutral perform better than 
women at the choice stage (p = 0.077).  
In the Neutral treatment, men enter the tournament about three times as often as women 
(40.3 % vs. 13.9 %). The gender gap is smaller in LOW is 8.3 percentage point lower but 
remains significant (38.1 % vs. 20 %). However, the gap in the HIGH decreases 
dramatically to 8.2 % (27.9 % vs. 19.7 %). High-power prime treatment has a substantial 
and significant impact on the gender gap by influencing risk attitudes and helping people 
make rational decisions. Male participants in High are significantly more risk averse than 
males in Neutral. From payoff-maximization perspective, the average entry rate should be 
25 %. The entry rates of both genders are insignificant different from 25 % while only 
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women in Low has a similar entry rate. Using performance at the second stage as a proxy, 
the expected entry rates are 28.3 % for men and 21.7 % for women. Women in all 
treatments enter at an optimal rate while it’s not the case for men in Neutral and LOW. 
Therefore, the priming comes into effect by adjusting men’s actions. This is noteworthy 
because unlike previous studies, this analysis intentionally manipulates the payoffs of 
tournament so that tournament yields a lower payoff than piece rate. Except priming, 
performance and confidence also play a role in entry decision.  
Both and Günther et al. (2010) cast doubt on men’s performance in verbal tasks, in which 
men are believed to be disadvantaged and attribute it to self-perception. Günther et al. 
(2010) maintain the results could result from the relevance of winning for self-esteem. 
Aronson et al. (1999) argue that stereotype threat also impede performance for people who 
view the task as relevant for self-esteem. In this paper, male participants may consider 
verbal task irrelevant therefore don’t suffer stereotype threat. In contrast, Wieland and Sarin 
(2012) argue that the self-worth control variable fully mediates the relationship between 
gender and competition preference. Not surprisingly, men attach more value to competition 
than women and the effect of gender on competition become insignificant after adding the 
self-worth variable to the model.  
Build on data of Gneezy et al. (2003) and Cotton et al. (2013)11, Cotton et al. (2015)12 
develop a simple theoretical model. They find that the explanation that men enjoy 
competition match with the findings of Gneezy et al. (2003) and Cotton et al. (2013) 
perfectly. Compare with women, men obtain more enjoyment from competition, which 
reduces costs of the efforts. The other explanation is that men are more able than women. 
For example, men are better at handling competitive pressure, which could because men 
are less susceptible to stereotype threat.  
4. Real outcomes 
4.1 Education outcomes 
Recently, the gender gaps in educational attainment have reversed. In United States, women 
                                                        
11 Cotton et al. (2013), which require subjects to perform math task, is reviewed in detail in section 5.5.1.  
12 Even though the model help connect theory with empirical evidences, the model only apply for certain types of 
competition with fixed performance rating. In Cotton et al. (2013), it’s one-on-one competition with males in mixed 
groups perform better than females in single-sex groups and worse than males in sing-sex groups. Females in mixed 
groups have the worst performance. In the six-people competition of Gneezy et al. (2003), participants ranked by 
tournament performance are males in gender-balanced groups, males in all-male groups, female in all-female groups, 
female in gender-balanced groups. 
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have earned more bachelor’s degrees than men since 1982, more master’s degrees since 
1987, more PhD degrees since 2006. Similar phenomena appear in many other developed 
nations and some developing countries. Women not only outnumber men on college, but 
also tend to have better academic performances during high school. The human capital 
theory predicts that individual should make educational decisions which can maximize their 
lifetime incomes. However, pecuniary factors such as expected returns to labor market are 
not the only determinant of educational choices because compare with equally able male 
counterpart, female students are concentrated in fields of study like Humanities and 
Language, while still lag behind in fields such as Science, Technology, Engineering, 
Mathematics (STEM). Therefore, in this section, I will start with how existing literatures use 
gender differences in competition to explain gender differences in major choices and then 
performance in admission exam and response to competition. In section 4.1.4, I will give a 
policy recommendation and evaluate its effect. Finally I would conclude and link education 
outcomes to labor market outcomes.  
4.1.1 Choice of academic track 
Using the approach developed by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), Buser et al. (2014) link 
the willingness to compete to choice of academic track in order to fill the gap between 
experimental results and real-life outcomes. After the experiment, participants are asked to 
fill in questionnaires which are designed to collect information about name, gender, self 
assessment of math ability and expected track choice. The experiment is conducted in four 
pre-university-level secondary schools a few months before the track choice to avoid 
reverse causality. In Netherlands, after graduating from primary school (grade 1 to 6), 
students need to make their first track decision: six-year pre-university, five-year general 
level and four-year vocational level. This track decision is mainly determined by scores of a 
nationwide test administered at the end of primary school. One fifth of Dutch students 
would go to six-year pre-university and be taught in the same class from grade 7 to grade 9. 
By the end of grade 9, students are offered four track options: Nature & Technology (NT); 
Nature & Health (NH); Economics & Society (ES); Culture & Society (CS). Students can 
choose tracks at will despite of the poor academic performance. Even though each track has 
its corresponding subjects, mathematics is the only one taught at a different level in each 
track. The order of math difficulty is NT>NH>ES>CS. Students are able to choose the 
combination of two tracks, therefore Buser et al. (2014) use the track stated in the 
questionnaires. There is a strong association between the study track at pre-university and 
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the choice of major in tertiary education.  
Consistent with Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), Buser et al. (2014) find that boys are also 
substantially more competitive than girls and competitiveness is strongly positively 
correlated with choosing more math-intensive academic tracks even conditional on 
academic ability. They conclude that the gender difference in competitiveness could explain 
about 20 % of the gender difference in track choice by the end of grade 9. 
Buser et al. (2017) find a similar pattern in Switzerland. In Swiss educational system, the 
compulsory schooling is composed of six-year primary school and three-year 
lower-secondary school. At the end of grade 9, most students either opt for vocational 
education within the Swiss apprenticeship system or for Baccalaureate school, an academic 
high school which prepares students for university. At the start of their high school 
education, Baccalaureate school students are offered 7 specialization options and need to 
choose one of them. In this paper, specializations’ math intensity levels are determined by 
specializations’ average math scores of a project administered by a canton-level Ministry of 
Education by the end of Baccalaureate school. The researchers go deeper in Physics and 
Math as it’s the only specialization which requires students to take more Math courses. The 
gender gap in competitiveness is 20 % after controlling for piece-rate performances and 
tournament performances. They find that Swiss students who choose to enter tournament 
are significantly more likely to choose math-intensive track, controlling for grades and 
performance in the experiment. Boys are substantially more likely to enter tournament and 
gender gap in competitiveness can explain a significant portion (9 %-17 %) of the gender 
difference in specialization choices even condition on socioeconomic backgrounds. 
Condition on academic performances and school, the propensity of opting for Physics and 
Math is 15.6 percentage points lower for girls, a large gap considering only 14 % of 
students would choose this major. While being competitive reduce the gap to 13 percentage 
points, which reduces about 17 % of the gap. 
Further, Buser et al. (2017) subdivide Swiss students into top, medium-high, medium low 
and bottom ability groups based on the level of their lower-secondary school. Students from 
bottom ability groups can only choose vocational track, while there’s no limitation for 
students from other three groups. The gender gap in willingness to compete is essentially 
zero among the lowest-ability students, but increases steadily with ability and reaches a 
peak for the highest-ability students. Willingness to compete predicts career choices along 
the whole ability distribution. Top-ability students who compete are more likely to choose a 
math or science-related academic specialization and girls who compete are more likely to 
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choose academic over vocational education in general. At the middle, competitive boys are 
more likely to choose a business-oriented apprenticeship, while competitive girls are more 
likely to choose a math-intensive apprenticeship or an academic education. At the bottom, 
students who compete are more likely to succeed in securing an apprenticeship position.     
In contrast, Reuben et al. (2017) fail to find the effect of competitiveness on college major 
choices, even though competitiveness has explanatory power on future earnings, which is a 
key determinant of major choices. All participants are students of New York University but 
from different grades and majors. In the post-experiment survey, participants are asked 
about their expected earnings after graduation and expected earnings if they were to 
complete different majors. They interpret the results as competitiveness has a muted impact 
on major choices because association between competitiveness and expected earnings exist 
across majors, not only in the major which students chose. Thus, competitiveness may be 
able to explain gender differences within major. 
Both Buser et al. (2017) and Reuben et al. (2017) use addition task as Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007) did and tournament entry to measure competitiveness, though slightly 
difference in experimental designs. There are several reasons for these different results.  
First, samples are not comparable (European high school students versus American college 
students). Buser et al. (2014) contend that their samples are close to the national averages in 
terms of track choices by gender, sample sex ratio, average scores and pass rates of national 
test at the end of grade 6. However, in Reuben et al. (2017), samples are made up of 
high-ability students with high socioeconomic background, shown in their SAT scores and 
parental characteristics. Evidence from some countries suggests that track placement has at 
least as much to do with socio-economic status as with actual student achievement. Kids 
from better off family might have higher risk tolerance. Saks and Shore (2005) find that 
students from wealthier backgrounds choose majors such as business more often than 
disadvantaged students. Also, individuals from poorer households may lack important 
information when make their major decisions. Hoxby and Avery (2013) find that bright 
students from disadvantaged backgrounds often fail to apply to selective colleges that have 
lower out-of-pocket costs than less selective schools. This occurs despite the fact that 
information about various schools, programs and costs is available freely online. Family 
background affects not only major choices but also competitiveness. Almås et al (2015) find 
that students from high socio-economic family background are more willing to compete. 
Therefore, factors such as family background that could obscure the real situation need 
more attention.  
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Second, the experiment of Buser et al. (2017) is done several months before the major 
choice decision, while the majority of participants of Reuben et al. (2017) have already 
made the decision before they participate in the experiment, which could lead to different 
study experiences and further affect their compensation scheme choice. After focusing on 
freshman and sophomore who have more similar coursework experiences and get similar 
results, Reuben et al. (2017) rule out the possibility of reverse causality. Neither did they 
find results biased in the direction of the relationship between competitiveness and major 
choice. However, Kamas and Preston (2012) find no gender difference in willingness to 
compete among students with STEM backgrounds and gender gaps among students in 
humanities and social sciences disappear after accounting for differences in confidence.  
However, even controlling for risk aversion and confidence, gender differences persist 
among business students. Male business students are more likely to enter tournament than 
men from other majors while female business students are slightly less likely to choose to 
compete than other women. They conclude different major choices might be potential 
explanation for the much larger gender gap (38 %) found by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) 
compare with results of other studies. Therefore, the relationship between competitiveness 
and major choices remains to be determined. 
Last but not least, settings matter. Betts (2011) contends that in North America, 
within-school tracks enable students to move between tracks or ability groups relatively 
easily over time; students could be in a high track in one subject and a low track in another 
subject; mistakes could be fixed relatively easily. By contrast, in many European countries, 
students are streamed into different schools, with either vocational or academic emphases. 
Brunello and Checchi (2007) compare tracking across countries, report that the age at first 
tracking in the United States is 18, despite Betts (2011) argue it’s not true unless ignore the 
within-school ability grouping and streaming that occurs as early as middle school. Niederle 
(2016) maintain that American educational system are more flexible about math-intensity 
taken at school while in continental Europe, these decisions are very binding. If American 
students have difficulties in a math class, they could switch to take an easier one next 
semester in high school. This difference in the way the decisions are made may in itself 
affect gender differences in choices of math intensive courses. This argument is supported 
by Fanny et al. (2018), who investigate whether track choice depends on the high school to 
which students are assigned. In France, students have to choose a major field of study at the 
end of their first year of high school, namely grade 10. Each field of study corresponds to a 
very specific curriculum, specific high school examinations, and specific opportunities after 
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high school. Therefore this decision is a key determinant of the undergraduate programs 
because science-related subjects only account for a small share of Humanities fields, which 
make it almost impossible for Humanities students to enter an engineering school. 
Additionally, students have little leeway to modify their major field of study during the two 
last years of high school. In France, selective schools are usually oversubscribed, therefore 
tend to have higher minimum admission scores, using regression discontinuity design, they 
compare students just above and below the cutoff. This analysis reveals that there is no 
gender gap in the willingness to attend more selective schools and enrollment at a more 
selective high school has little effect on students' performance on high school exit exams 
and on boys’ track choice. However girls turn away from scientific fields and settle for less 
competitive and prestigious ones, that is, humanities. Effects are even larger for girls at the 
top of the ability distribution. They reject the possibility that enrollment in Humanities is 
due to high-quality courses provided by selective high school. Also, the fact that enrollment 
at selective schools has much stronger effects on girls' choices does not seem to be a mere 
consequence of the fact that girls are relatively stronger in humanities and boys relatively 
stronger in science. Fanny et al. (2018) argue that the introduction of the centralized process 
shift peer competition from lower ability students to higher ability ones and induce opposite 
changes in the level of competition faced by the two groups of students. Thus gender gap 
becomes larger and significant among high-ability 
To sum up, Betts (2011) contend that obviously different countries have its own definitions 
of tracking and ability grouping, while existing measures of tracking do a rather poor job of 
identifying what these differences are. Therefore further work should put more emphasis on 
better measurement and endogenous problems, especially for cross-country comparison, 
better information on what tracking really is and careful thought about why countries vary 
in tracking policy would help convince readers that something close to causal is being 
measured. 
 4.1.2 Entry exam 
Entry exam is usually highly competitive, especially those for selective programmes or 
schools. It’s straightforward to consider scores of entry exam as performance under 
competitive context, the approach introduced by Gneezy et al.(2003). Ors et al. (2013) 
select applicants for HEC in 2005-2007, the top business school in France ranked by 
Financial Times and compare scores of the same cohort of people in three exams: relatively 
low competitive national baccalauréat exam (serves as high school exit exam, results don’t 
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depend on others’ performance and success rates are over 82 % for the whole sample) and 
first year exams of program with approximately 99% of master students validate their first 
year study at HEC. Instead, the entry exam of HEC is highly competitive only 11% of 
candidates would get accepted. They find that men perform better than women in the 
competitive entry exam while women performed significantly better at baccalauréat exam 
and, once admitted and after finishing first-year studies at HEC, women perform better at 
nonmathematics-oriented course. Among the top 10 % of applicants, namely selected 
students, men outperform women and there’s no significant gender difference in 
performance among the bottom 10 % of applicants. Their findings confirm that females 
tend to perform worse in more competitive environment. They rule out the possibility that 
women’s underperformance in entry exam is driven by gender differences in innate abilities 
and mathematics and view risk aversion as possible explanation. This paper complements 
experimental results as monetary rewards in the lab are quite small, for instance, in Niederle 
and Vesterlund (2007), winners of tournament only get 2 dollars for each correct answer, in 
case of a tie, winners only get 1 dollar. The average annual salary of HEC MSc alumni is 
approximately 13,000 dollars higher than the average annual salary of the alumni of the 
second best business school, which accounts for 24.5 % of the latter group of people. Thus, 
this paper shows gender differences in competition at large stakes. 
Follow Ors et al. (2013), Jurajda and Munich (2011) study the performance of Czech 
secondary-school graduates who apply for universities. At the end of secondary school, both 
vocational program students and academic program students could take the national 
secondary school exit test, a prerequisite for university. Shortly after the national test, over 
half of students would apply for university and each university program selects its students 
in a separate competition, almost always using a program-specific written admission exam. 
They compare the admission chances at a given university of equally male and female 
applicants, measured by scores of noncompetitive national test. In order to avoid problems 
driven by gender differences in program-specific unobservables such as program-specific 
skills and by discrimination in grading university admission test, they focus on 
gender-balanced program which the share of women is between 25 % and 75 % of 
applicants and control for subject-of-study preferences. They find that men significantly 
perform better than women when admission rate is below 19 % and no significant gender 
difference in performance when admission rate is higher. This gender differences holds for 
both the most and the least able groups of applicants. In the robustness check, they report 
that selection on unobservable subject-specific skills is unlikely to be an explanation. 
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In comparison to the paper of Ors et al. (2013), which claim that gender differences in 
performance of three exams aren’t caused by differences in test-taking strategy, Pekkarinen 
(2014) argue that gender differences in performance of entrance examination for nine 
Finnish universities can be partially explained by differences in answering decisions. In line 
with Ors et al. (2008), they find that women have better performance in high school and 
thus, higher starting points. Gender differences in performance of entry exam emerge upon 
controlling for starting points. Use the Rasch Model to derive the predicted probabilities of 
answering items correctly for each applicant, they show that women deviate more from the 
optimal number of items than men and that they do so because they tend to answer too few 
items. 
Instead of entrance examination for university in western high income countries, Zhang 
(2012) turn her attention to the choice of entry exam for high school in China. Zhang (2012) 
argues that participants who choose tournament are more likely to take the exam, 
controlling for prior test scores and that neither exam fee nor parents attitudes toward entry 
exam could explanations the gap in exam choices. 
4.1.3 External changes 
Men and women may react differently to changes in external learning environment. Unlike 
admission exam nor track and major choice, which enable students to make preparations 
and put efforts during a long period of time, those changes usually occur suddenly.  
Positive change could be scholarship. Price (2008) investigates the effect of Graduate 
Education Initiative (GEI), a competitive fellowship aimed at increasing graduation rates 
and decreasing time to degree. This fellowship was announced in March 1991 and launched 
later that year. The awards are very generous as it increased the stipend of recipients by 
64%. Unlike one-shot tasks in the lab, the awards require long-term effort, which is closer 
to the reality. By comparing outcomes of pre-GEI students with students who entered 
between 1989 and 1990 so there could be no selection about competition preference, the 
author concludes that men’s performance, measured by time to candidacy, increased after 
the implementation of the program, with the largest gains for men in departments with the 
highest proportions of female students. Women did not increase performance on average 
and only start to compete when they are in groups that are at least 58% female. Both male 
and female students benefit from the proportion of female in groups. 
Negative change could be a reduction in admission rates or an increase in applicants, both 
intensify competition. Morin (2015) evaluate the response of both gender to an educational 
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reform which shorten the 5-year secondary school to 4-year. This reform is announced in 
1997 and the first cohort of the new educational system starts in September 1999, hence 
create a ‘double cohort’ in 2003. The increase in the number of applicants is significantly 
greater than the increase in enrollment, therefore reduce the enrollments-to-applicants ratio 
from 71% to 55%. Because the educational reform changes the teaching content of 
mathematics, the author excludes mathematics courses from the analysis. Comparing 
performance of pre-reform students with that of post-reform student, the author finds that 
male average grades and the proportion of male students graduating “on time” increased 
relative to females. The author rule out the possibility that girls who are supposed to 
graduate in 2003 applied for university in 2002 in order to avoid competition. Further the 
analysis does not suggest that the results presented are due to gender differences in the 
dropping out decision process. 
Booth et al. (2018) investigate the speedboat racing in Japan in which participants are 
randomly assigned to mixed groups or single-sex groups. People of both genders receive 
same training from the Yamato Boat School, the only training school. Also, participants 
compete under the same conditions. They find that female participants are more likely to be 
assigned to single-sex groups whereas men are more likely to be assigned to mixed-sex 
groups. Hence in mixed-sex groups, the sex ratio is skewed towards men. When being 
assigned to mixed groups, men behave more aggressive while women act less aggressive, 
measured by lane changing. Women have better performance in a single-sex environment 
even they have chosen a competitive career.   
4.1.4 Policy implication: Single-sex school 
Based on results above, one of the possible policy implications would be single-sex school. 
Akerlof and Kranton (2002) argue that students care about the extent to which their 
behavior deviates from that of their social group. The presence of men might make women 
be more alert to their gender, and if ‘competitiveness’ is considered as a masculine 
characteristic, women in mixed environment may prone to stereotype threat. In this context 
which female students pay too much attention to their negative identity, investments in 
education depend not only on individual benefits, such as test scores and grades, but also on 
social benefits, such as whether a particular level of effort is consistent with the behavior of 
one’s social group. Walton et al. (2015) administer the experiments to foster a sense of 
belonging among female students from engineering, a typical male-dominated field of study. 
They report that GPA in Engineering courses of female students in treatment group increase 
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by 4 %. 
The optimal level of competition in class may be different for females and males and the 
relative homogeneity of single-sex school make it easier for teachers to adjust the 
competition level and tailor their pedagogical approaches for the given set of students. 
However, the relationship between single-sex school and competitiveness shown in existing 
literatures is mixed and less conclusive. 
Booth et al. (2012) show that compare with girls from coeducational school, girls from 
single-sex schools are more likely to select tournament even when randomly assigned to 
mixed experimental groups. Girls who are assigned to single-sex experimental groups 
choose to enter the tournament more than girls in mixed groups even they stay in sing-sex 
group for only 20 minutes. It thus suggests that observed gender differences might reflect 
socialization rather than inherent gender attributes. 
Lee et al. (2014) find that in Seoul, South Korea, single-sex schooling does not reduce the 
gender gap in competitiveness conditional on student and parental characteristics. They 
maintain endogeneity won’t be a problem because within a school district, a student is 
randomly assigned to a single-sex or coeducational school; the assignment rule does not 
take students’ preferences into consideration. All school districts in Seoul have both 
single-sex and coeducational schools, hence students can’t choose schools they want by 
moving to other districts. Another advantage is that all middle schools are subject to the 
same educational policies, such as curriculum, number of school days, and teacher hiring 
which allow them to identify the causal effect of single-sex schooling on competitiveness. 
However, Park et al.(2012) argue that single-sex schools in Seoul are predominantly private 
and enjoy a great autonomy in teacher selection and teacher tenure policies. Differences in 
teachers’ characteristics and the interaction between teachers and students need to be taken 
into account. 
Studies about single-sex school are almost always plagued with (self-) selection problems. 
Thus Booth et al.(2012) use instrumental variables (post codes and distance between home 
and school) to predict the probability of attending a single-sex school as sensitivity analyses 
and the coefficients to single-sex schooling are still of significance. Therefore, they 
conclude that schooling environment has an effect on individuals’ propensity to choose a 
tournament. Niederle and Vesterlund (2010) point out that it is not possible to determine 
whether this response results from the superior performance by students at the single-sex 
schools. This could be the case. In Booth et al. (2012), samples are from Suffolk and Essex, 
two British counties. The United Kingdom used to channeled students into different types of 
  44 
schools based on a test students take when they aged 11(11+ exam), but began to move 
away from this system in the 1960s. In this educational reform, central government also 
requires local authorities to establish coeducational comprehensive schools. The old 
educational system survived in some areas but was abolished in most others. Thus there is 
no single-sex public schools in Suffolk, all single-sex school in this paper are from Essex. 
In Essex, students still need to take 11+ exam if they want to study at sing-sex school. In 
order to make samples comparable, Booth et al. (2012) only recruit higher-ability students 
from academic track of coeducational school.  
Hence, some papers use random assignment to try to solve this problem. Eisenkopf et al. 
(2015) look into students from the same high school. Students are randomly assigned to 
mixed class or all-girl class and all face the same curriculum. The students’ academic 
performance is observed up to four years. They show that single-sex class improves the 
performance of female students in mathematics, especially for girls who had high scores in 
entry exam. However, there’s no significant difference in Germen test scores among two 
kinds of girls. They explain the improvement as single-sex schooling strengthens female 
students’ self-confidence and make girls to perceive their mathematics skills more 
accurately and positively. Indeed, Students are assigned to classes randomly but might 
choose the school intentionally because this school focus on pedagogical subjects therefore 
attract students aspire to study in Education major. Therefore this school is more attractive 
for female students which make 80 % of students are female. 
4.1.5 Conclusion 
The majority of papers listed above refer to the gap in math, one of the hottest issues in 
gender differences. Even if women now have greater educational attainment in many 
industrial countries, men still tend to outperform women in Maths. Schrøter Joensen and 
Skyt Nielsen (2010) report that maths skills have a causal effect on labor market outcomes 
and there is evidence that the individual returns to maths skills are higher than the returns 
to other skills (Buonanno & Pozzoli, 2009; Koedel & Tyhurst, 2012).  
Niederle and Vesterlund(2010) argue that if women can’t handle competitive pressures as 
well as men did, then test scores may be unable to measure truly math skills, and may 
exaggerate the male math advantage. Noncognitive factors may not only affect an 
individual’s investments in cognitive skills, but also the individual’s test score performance. 
Follow the experiments designed by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) completely, Masayuki 
(2018) confirms the argument by investigating the effect of competitiveness on math 
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achievement among Japanese public middle school students. Consistent with previous 
studies, girls are less competitive and men have higher math scores. Being competitive 
improve the math achievement, controlling for prior achievements and demographics 
characteristics. The coefficient on the entry dummy is 0.105 and significant at 10 % level. 
The average growth in math scores from 8th to 9th grade is 0.5 hence it accounts for over 
20 % of the growth. Being competitive could reverse the gender gap as the coefficient on 
female dummy is -0.083.Further analysis concludes that competitiveness has an effect 
independent of risk attitudes and other factors and could explain about 9.2 % to 13.5 % of 
the gender gap in math achievement. Iriberri et al. (2018) conduct 3-stage competition to 
select winners and show that despite the higher math scores at school, girls perform worse 
in competitive environment. The increase in competitive pressure widens the gender gap. 
The bad performance is not caused by selection, discrimination or differences in reaction to 
increasing difficulty. 
Fryer et al. (2010) find earlier results that countries with higher gender equality index tend 
to have a smaller gender gap in math are sensitive to the inclusion of Middle East countries, 
where there’s a high-degree of sex-segregated education and no gender gap in Math. 
In conclusion, further research needs to focus on selection problems of single-sex schools 
and try to find which group of people is most likely to be affected. If high-ability women 
would benefit most from single-sex schooling without hurting others, then it could enhance 
efficiency and reduce gender gap and inequality. 
4.2 Labor market outcomes 
Female students tend to have better academic performance, but this advantage at school 
doesn’t translate into advantages at labor market, measured by earnings. In this section, I 
would go through several crucial stages of employment to see how competitiveness shapes 
women’s employment decisions. 
4.2.1 Job sorting and gender segregation 
Gender differences in preferences for competition offer explanations for job sorting — the 
first step of entering labor market. Also, especially in some European countries, the major 
choice at high school is decisive for career path. 
Kleinjans (2009) finds that women’s reluctance to competition can explain part of the 
gender segregation in occupational fields. Based on the assumption that occupational 
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expectations are strong predictors of later career attainment of professionals, the author uses 
occupational expectations as a proxy for occupational choice. In the survey, 2312 19 years 
old Danish students are asked about their occupational expectations when they are about 30 
years old. The author doesn’t use the performance or entry of choice to measure 
competition preference. Instead, students are asked to what extent they agree with the 
following statement: ‘‘Outside the world of sports, people should compete as little as 
possible”. The 5-point scale options range from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely 
agree). According to Danish educational system, the author divides educational levels 
required for the expected occupation into 3 types: vocational training or less, short- or 
medium-cycle education, and college or more. The author summarizes that a greater distaste 
for competition is related to a lower fraction of women expecting to work in an occupation 
requiring a college degree. After controlling for ability and socioeconomic background, 
competitiveness reduce gender segregation in the fields of Law, Business & Management, 
Health, and Education. If an average woman increases her competitiveness to an average 
man level, the predicted probabilities to work in education field decrease by 4.6 %, in health 
fields decrease by 4.2 %, in law, business and management fields increases by 9.2 %. 
There are two main concerns. First, women who have strong preferences for kids may 
prefer flexible working hours and family friendly, normally less challenging jobs. In the 
robustness check, the author includes job characteristics described by working hours and 
job safety as proxies and finds similar results. The author attributes to the high female labor 
force participation, generous maternal leave and universal childcare. Also, gender difference 
in labor force participation rate in Denmark is quite small. However, if women with lower 
fertility expectations have stronger willingness to compete, the effect of competitiveness 
would be biased upwards. The author thinks it won’t be a problem because about 90 % of 
Danish women aged 49 have kids. 
The second concern is omitted variable bias. In this analysis, main control variables are 
ability (measured by test scores) and family background. It could be possible that 
self-confidence and risk aversion could affect both competition preference and occupational 
expectation. However, including self-confidence variable did not alter the outcome. 
Unfortunately, there is no measure of risk aversion in the data even distaste for competition 
is likely to reflect at least some of these attitudes indirectly, according to previous studies. 
However, it should be noted that in this paper, both Skilled Trades, the occupational field 
with highest level of gender segregation and Science and Engineering, the traditional 
male-dominated field, are not affected by competitiveness. Therefore, gender segregation in 
  47 
these fields is likely to stem from other sources. Also the author drops about one fourth of 
total 3084 observations due to the missing important information, mainly about 
occupational expectations. This leads to a slightly positive selection in terms of family 
background and ability. Therefore, results might underestimate the effect of competitiveness 
on job selection if children from low socioeconomic backgrounds are less willing to 
compete.  
Reuben et al. (2015) investigates whether competition preference explains subsequent 
gender differences in earnings and industry choice in a sample of high-ability MBA 
graduates from University of Chicago, one of the top business schools in United States. Top 
business positions is one of the areas with dramatic gender gap, as documented by Equilar 
(2015), who reports that women represented only 6.5% of the best-paid CEOs in 2014 and 
were paid 9.9 % less than their male counterparts. Therefore, focusing on this group of 
people, who would be candidates for these positions in the future, could help us better 
understand gender differences in this field. 
During the first month of their MBA study, students are invited to join in a survey which 
collects information about demographic characteristics and personality traits. After the 
survey, students would participate in experiments that were designed to measure individual 
characteristics: risk preferences, other-regarding preferences, and competition preferences. 
In the first year of the program, career services would hold job fairs to help MBA students 
obtain an internship in a firm. In the second year, MBA students can decide whether to stay 
at the interned firm if they were offered a job or look for other jobs. 
Industry categories are based on NAICS industry codes: finance (code 52), professional 
services, which they refer to as “consulting” (code 54), and “other” (the remaining 
two-digit codes). The information included data on financial earnings, which includes 
salaries as well as yearly and one-time bonuses. 
This paper has multiple advantages: First, earning data is provided by university career 
services and students’ corresponding employers, rather than self-reported, therefore reduce 
measurement errors caused by overconfident people overstate their earnings. Second, 
students are tracked over 7 years after they enter labor market, which allows them to 
determine the long-term effect of competitiveness on earnings and taking factors such as 
marriage, pregnancy and childrearing into consideration. Also the authors have employment 
information of MBA students before they start studying. Hence, it’s able to indentify the 
impact of competition preferences in different stages of the job market. Last but not least, 
competition preference is measured at the beginning of the MBA program therefore it’s not 
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affected by MBA study experiences. Even though men have a longer work experience 
before getting admitted, Reuben et al. (2015) don’t find any correlations between 
competition preference and participants’ characteristics at the admissions stage, so former 
work experience is unlikely to cause gender differences in competitiveness.  
They report that competition preference comes into effect when participants decide in 
which firm to intern. Participants who choose to enter tournament are 8.4 % more likely to 
intern in consulting and 8.5 % less likely to intern in other industries, compare with 
individuals who choose to piece rate. Thereafter, the gap grows as firms decide formal 
employees and participants decide whether to continue working at the interned firm. At 
graduation, a competitive participant is 7.1 % more likely to work in consulting, 4.3 % 
more likely to work in finance, and 11.5 % less likely to work in another industry. Hence, 
competition taste is also a good predictor of the industry participants choose to work in at 
graduation and several years later. Competitive individuals are more likely to start and keep 
working in consulting and finance (to a less extent, though) rather than in other industries. 
However, even after controlling for competition preferences, risk attitudes, and individual 
characteristics, gender gap still remains and gender still play an important role in the 
industry participants work in.  
Men and women self select into different industries and this difference persists. Female 
MBAs are 8 % more likely to work in other industries at graduation and 12 % more likely 
to work in other industries seven years later. At graduation, male MBA students are about 
50 % more likely to work in finance industries; this gender difference persists over time 
even though both men and woman shift to other industries. Women who start their careers 
in finance are significantly more likely to move to other industries than men. Second, 
individuals who started their career in consulting are significantly more likely to transition 
to finance and less likely to transition to other industries if they chose the tournament 
compared to individuals who chose piece-rate. The gender gap in selection into industries 
emerges at the very beginning of the MBAs’ job market. This gender difference is more 
clear if pay attention to the application stage. Compare with men, women send fewer 
applications for internships at finance industries and more applications for consulting and 
other industries. Hence, women receive fewer invitations from finance firms and more 
invitations from consulting and other firms in consulting and other industries.  
With respect to wage, individuals who chose to enter the tournament earn 9 % more than 
their less competitive counterparts do with the largest difference for the top earners. 
Moreover, gender differences in competitiveness could explain around 10 % of the overall 
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gender gap which is half as much a rich set of variables such as demographic characteristics, 
academic performance, etc did. Also, competitive individuals are more likely to work in 
high-paying industries nine years later, which suggests the persistent effect on earnings. 
Reuben et al. (2015) also try to figure out why competitive individuals earn more money. If 
competitive individuals are simply better at the tasks demanded by better-paid jobs, then 
this positive selection widens the pay gap. Even they don’t detect the correlation between 
competition preferences and GPA and GMAT scores, they believe it is possible for taste for 
competition to reflect differences in ability that are not captured by conventional measures. 
This is confirmed by the fact that competition preference has relatively weak effects when 
interactions between participants and firms are limited. At first, it’s difficult for firms to 
select competitive individuals and for participants to identify their comparative advantages 
caused by competitiveness based on existing information. After two parties have 
meaningful contact with each other, employers are able to observe the higher productivity 
of competitive individuals and competitive participants feel comfortable and they are 
qualified for this job. The positive impact of competitiveness increase as matching process 
proceeds. Another potential explanation is that competitive individuals are more willing to 
negotiate their earnings with their employers, which is not supported by analysis. A third 
explanation is tastes. If people gain disutility from working under competitive environment, 
the wage gap would be premium compensation for workers. Therefore future research needs 
to identify the specific characteristics of competitive workplaces that competitive 
individuals find less distasteful. 
In line with Reuben et al. (2015), in Reuben et al. (2017), students are asked about their 
expected wage of full-time works, to eliminate bias introduced by gender differences in 
labor supply. They find that even though both gender expect to earn much higher than 
average US college students of same gender and same major, female students clearly expect 
to earn less than male students and this difference increases with age: from 31 % less at age 
30 to 39 % less at age 45, on average. They report that gender differences in overconfidence 
and competitiveness combined explain 18 % of the gender gap in wage expectation. The 
two measures explain in total as much of the gender gap in earnings expectations as a rich 
set of control variables. Reuben et al. (2017) rule out the possibility that gender gap in 
expected wage is driven by misperception of labor market. Students’ beliefs about the 
gender pay gap among general population are quite close to the true gender gap. Also 
competitive and overconfident students do not expect to work longer than their counterpart. 
However, competitive and overconfident students do show less aversion to earnings 
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uncertainty. Earnings expectations are a significant determinant of major choice as 
differences in major choice can explain about one third of gender gap in wage expectation. 
Kamas and Preston (2018) look into the specific effects of these two measures, and find 
neither competition preference nor confidence alone could cause an increase in wage. Like 
Reuben et al. (2017), this paper only includes full-time workers. Men not only have a higher 
annual wage but also work longer weekly, compare with women. The gender pay gap, 
which already appears at the beginning of careers, increases from 8.8 % to 13.6 % if bonus 
is included. Women who are more willing to compete and more confident earn substantial 
more than other women while there’s no significant effect on men’s wage. Half of the 
positive effect on female wage is explained by college major and labor market controls such 
as employment status. However even after conditioning on these characteristics, a higher 
taste for competition for the most confident women results in more than a 7 % increase in 
compensation, the magnitude is able to reverse the negative effect of gender on 
compensation differential (−6.2%). While other factors, such as family responsibilities, may 
lead to gender differentials in compensation later in their careers, for the years immediately 
after graduating from college, confidence and preferences for competition do lead to higher 
earnings for women. In line with Kamas and Preston (2012), there is a correlation between 
decisions to compete and major choice in Kamas and Preston (2018). Kamas and Preston 
(2018) maintain that women who have preference for competition may select into well paid 
sectors of employment. 
4.2.2 Performance pay  
Section 2.1 describes that men and women tend to have different job preferences, however 
it’s hard to compare competitive pressure across industries. Thus Flory et al.(2015) restrict 
jobs to administrative assistant to examine whether the compensation scheme, by itself, can 
cause differential job entry. They posted employment advertisements online and use 
applicants’ resumes to gather information about personal characteristics. This experiment is 
held in 16 major American cities therefore factors like local labor market conditions can be 
taken into account. Competitiveness of the jobs is manipulated by changing the degree of 
dependence on relative performance. There’re in total 5 types compensation schemes: 
fixed-wage individual work (T1), fixed-wage group work (T2), lightly depend on personal 
relative performance (T3), heavily depend on personal relative performance (T4), and 
heavily depend on team relative performance (T5). Job-seekers know compensation 
schemes only after they express interest in the position. 
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Results show that women disproportionately shy away from performance-based 
compensation. Conditional on expressing initial interest in the job, in general, men are 
significantly more likely to apply. This gender gap is most pronounced in the T4, the 
treatment with highest level of competition. Thus the authors argue that women are daunted 
by competitive workplaces when apply for jobs. It might be straightforward to conclude that 
men are motivated by competition while women choose to avoid competition, which is 
documented by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). However the analysis shows that both men 
and women shy sway from the competitive compensation schemes, but women show a 
significantly stronger aversion to competitive workplaces, compared with men. 
There are some factors that influence gender gap except the degree of performance pay. 
First, using local median wage of administrative assistant and gender pay gap as proxies for 
outside options, they find that when women have less alternative options, they show less 
aversion to competitive work settings. Second, even though both compensation schemes are 
heavily reliant on relative performance, when women work in team to against other groups, 
they are more likely to apply for this position.  
In Samek’s paper, college students receive e-mail invitations about an open position job, 
temporary research assistant. The author set the compensation scheme as (1) flat rate, (2) 
performance-based bonus or (3) non performance-based bonus. In order to isolate the effect 
of social preferences, the job is described in 2 ways, non-profit and profitable, holding all 
else constant. The charity manipulation was conducted for both the flat and 
performance-based compensation schemes. The author maintains that both genders are 
discouraged by the performance-based compensation schemes from applying, but the effect 
is larger and statistically significant for women. The effect is not caused by aversion to 
uncertainty in payoff. Social preferences increase application rates but don’t reduce the 
gender gap in competitiveness. The willingness to compete is mediated by career choice, 
Business and Engineering students show preferences for competition.  
Lavy (2013) examine how teachers’ performance, measured by scores of their classes, is 
affected by a competitive environment by providing cash bonuses. The author finds no 
evidence of gender differences in performance under competition in any gender 
composition of class. Women, however, were more pessimistic about the effectiveness of 
teachers’ performance pay and less confident about their chance of winning.  
However, the evidence is far from conclusive if use national level data. Manning and Saidi 
(2010) estimate the degree that a worker’s compensation is based on performance as a 
proxy for a job’s competitiveness. Using data from the 1998 and 2004 British Workplace 
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Employment Relations Survey, they find that British women are only slightly less likely 
than men to be paid according to relative performance, and performance pay has similar 
effect on both gender’s wages.  
There’re several potential criticisms. This paper is based on the assumption that 
performance pay occurs exogenously. Bryson et al. (2014) use data from the 2011 British 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey and contend that performance pay contracts are 
more likely to be used in higher paying sectors, which more able people are likely to work 
in. The premium rises along with the wage distribution: it is seven times higher at the 90th 
percentile than it is at the 10th percentile in the wage distribution. Hence, in my opinion, if 
performance pay is a good indicator of competitiveness, further research should link the 
self-selection of women into low-paying jobs to the degree of competitiveness in 
compensation schemes, which might find a larger impact of competition preference on 
wages. 
Also, Manning and Saidi (2010) ask workers about how much effort they think they need to 
put in the job and find that men’s effort response to performance pay is largest in 
female-dominated jobs while women seem to respond less to such an incentive in 
male-dominated jobs. Thus further studies need to look into the performance pay in 
male-dominated and female-dominated jobs specifically 
McGee et al. (2015) using data from the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY) 
1979 and1997 cohorts to estimate the relevance of competitive compensation to gender pay 
gap in United States. In the NLSY1979, performance pay included piece-rates, 
commissions, bonuses, stock options and other performance pay; in the NLSY97, it 
included commissions, bonuses and incentive pay. Unlike Manning and Saidi (2010), this 
paper distinguishes the competitiveness of different types of performance pay. Also McGee 
et al. (2015) don’t include firm fixed effects which are impossible to detect in NLSY. 
Consistent with the laboratory studies, they find that women are less likely to work in jobs 
whose compensation schemes depend heavily on performance pay, despite the magnitude 
are smaller than that of gender differences in competition. However, gender differences in 
compensation schemes can only explain 6.2 % of the gender wage gap in NLSY 1997 and 
2.9 % of in the NLSY1979, controlling for personal characteristics. Results show that the 
most competitive performance pay measure is bonus while the least is piece rate. 
4.2.3 Promotion 
Women might be disadvantaged in two aspects: first, if women have worse performances in 
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competitive environment, then they are less likely to be promoted as promotion usually 
based on productivity. Second, even if women are equally able as men, if they have much 
lower chances of applying, then fewer women would get promoted. 
De Paola et al. (2017) analyze the Italian promotion system and find significant but small 
gender gap in the likelihood to apply for academic promotion and conclude that the 
application rate gap is mainly driven by gender differences in risk aversion and confidence 
and the fear of discrimination. 
In Italy, individuals who want to get associate or full professor positions must take a 
nation-wide and field-level competition (NSQ). The applicant would be evaluated by a 
5-people committee randomly selected and formed from the full professor pool. The 
committee use general criteria like CV and publications and are allowed to adopt additional 
criteria. However, no teaching lecture or oral presentation is required. Hence there’s no 
direct contact between the committee and the applicant, hence gender difference in 
performances in the competitive contexts won’t be a problem. Failed candidates are not able 
to apply in the following two years. Candidates who reach the minimum threshold and 
obtain the qualification will be considered for promotion. 99 % of new positions are filled 
through internal promotions due to the much lower cost, about 70 % less. Moreover, higher 
positions don’t require for extended work hours. As a result, the Italian promotion system 
allows researchers to eliminate the effect of factors such as unobserved ex-ante abilities, 
unwillingness to work longer and move to another university and city. 
Except productivity(measured by the quantity and quality of publications) and 
experience(the number of years the applicant has been hired), the authors also include 
controls like possible connections between the applicant and professors who are eligible 
evaluators and effective connection between applicant and committee members, take the 
value of one if they belong to the same university. Controlling for those variables, they 
report that being a women reduce the propensity of entering the competition by four to five 
percentage points, which make up 8 %-10 % of male application rate.  
However, it’s unable to measure competition preferences of applicants according to existing 
data. Therefore the authors divide applicants into 4 groups according to their productivity 
and they find the propensity of applying increases with productivity. Among the bottom 
25 % of applicants, women are 6.3 % less like to apply, the gender gap is substantial 
considering the chance of applying for this group of people is only 28%. However, this gap 
decreases with productivity. A female applicant with average productivity is 3.4 % less 
likely to apply. The gender gap completely disappears among high ability group. The 
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authors also divide fields according to the measurability of productivity and report that 
women are 3 % less likely to apply in fields which productivity is easily measured and 
5.4 % less likely in other fields. The authors also investigate the impact of women’s success 
in the field, measured by the share of female professor at the time of application and the 
share of female assistant professor. The results show that in a field in which women’s 
success is one SD below the mean, women are 9.5 % less likely to apply, ceteris paribus. 
This gender gap reduces to 3.3 % when women’s success is 1 SD above the mean. They 
don’t find any evidence for gender discrimination in NSQ, but can’t rule out the possibility 
of downward biased results as applicants have been self selected. 
Bosquet et al.(2018) assess the gender gap in French promotion system, which is quite 
similar to the Italian system. There are two types of academic positions in France, 
university researchers and researchers of public research organization (in this paper, the 
authors only focus on researchers from CNRS, the largest research organization, for 
simplicity), lead to the dual track promotion system. University researchers need to spend a 
lot of time preparing for 4-stage evaluation, consists of the research seminar and three oral 
exams which would take half of year while CNRS researchers only need to submit CV and 
a research project. Also, researchers who get promoted are usually unable to stay in the 
original university. Women are less often to apply for promotion. Then the authors 
decompose gender differences in the probability of being promoted into two factors: 
differences in the probability of applying and success. They report for university researchers, 
almost 70 % of the raw gender gap in promotion are due to the application gap, and it 
widens even larger (76 %) when characteristics are accounted for. For CNRS researchers, 
the gender gap in promotion that can be explained by gap in apply is about 55 %. Therefore, 
the application stage is crucial. Publications, which favor men, have a moderate effect. 
Bosquet et al. (2018) contend that gender gap in application rates could be the following 
reasons: 1) the higher cost for female if female are less geographically mobile; 2) female 
researchers value the promotion less; 3) fear of possible discrimination; 4) distaste for 
competition. Men are very likely to apply when the success rate is low and the top 5 % of 
women, even are two times more likely to get promoted than the bottom 25 % of women, 
the number of applicants only increase by 10 %. However, the existing data is insufficient 
to determine whether men apply too much and women apply not enough.  
By contrast, research output is the key determinant of the probability of success regardless 
of the type of researchers. The main gender difference is in the first stage in which women 
are less likely to enter next round. While in the final stage, being a women increase the 
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likelihood of being promoted. The authors interpret it as the negative unconscious 
discrimination at the beginning and the positive conscious discrimination in the final stage. 
However, Booth et al. (2003) find that full-time women are promoted more often than 
full-time men with unadjusted data from British Household Panel Survey. Controlling for 
individual heterogeneity, they find no gender difference in the probability of being 
promoted. However, men would receive larger wage rewards. They propose a sticky floor 
model to explain the phenomenon. Sticky floor could be result from the worse market 
alternatives faced by women. If it’s the case, then more women are promoted and promoted 
and retained women experience small wage increases upon promotion. It could also due to 
the unfair treatment which discriminates against women by firms. Under this circumstance, 
men end up with a higher wage while promoted women are more likely to quit than 
promoted men. Both models show that women benefit less from promotion but be promoted 
at the same rate as men. 
There’re also some evidences for gender differences in task choices, such as women 
allocate their time to tasks in a different way. Lazear and Rosen (1990) allege that if women 
have better non-market outside options, then women would reduce the investment of human 
capital which could contribute to promotion. Engaging in non-promotable tasks would take 
time away from promotable tasks, widening the gap in productivity and put oneself in a 
relatively disadvantaged position. For example, for research-oriented jobs like assistant 
professors, working on research papers is more relevant than holding an orientation party, 
with regard to the likelihood of being promoted. Therefore, Babcock et al. (2017) examine 
the choice of performing an effortless task that everyone prefers be completed by someone 
else. The experiments are conducted in mixed sex groups and then single-sex groups. 
There’re 10 rounds and in each round, participants are assigned to groups of three and then 
decide whether to invest during the following two minutes. If no one invests, each group 
member could get 1 dollar. If someone invests, the investor would get 1.25 dollar while the 
payoff for other two people is 2 dollars. Results show that in the first experiment, women 
invest 3.4 times and men invest 2.3 times, the 48 % difference is significant. Controlling for 
risk and other regarding preferences doesn’t eliminate the gender differences, suggests a 
gender difference in belief that women are more likely to invest. The second experiment, in 
which participants have group members of their own sex, the investment rate is similar. 
Then the authors evaluate from demand side, whether women are more likely to be asked to 
invest than man. In the third experiment, subjects are divided into groups of four, and then 
decide who to be investor after seeing the photos of other three people. The requestor would 
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be randomly selected from these four people after each member submit their decision. The 
result would be published on the screen while the chosen investor still has discretion over 
the acceptance of the request. Results show the mean and median numbers of requests for 
men are 8.7 and 9, respectively, while for women they are 11.1 and 12. There’s no gender 
difference in investment rates for people who are not requested, both are 14%. While for 
people who are chosen, even though the request significantly increases the likelihood of 
investment, men still have lower probability of investment (51 % versus 76 %). In the last 
experiment, the authors rule out the possibility that participants are more generous toward 
men and confirm the effect of belief. Babcock et al. (2017) summarize that if gender 
differences in task allocation result in gender differences in productivity, then the 
unbalanced allocation would persist as it would be efficient to assign less promotable tasks 
to less productive female workers. 
There are two papers analyze from the employers side that needs to be noted and support 
the argument of Babcock et al.(2017). Peterle et al. (2017) use calculation task and design a 
4-step experiment: piece rate, tournament, promotion game, tournament/piece rate (depends 
on position). In the promotion game, participants would be either an employee or an 
employer. Experimental firms are composed of one employer and three workers who 
compete for one position. The employee who gets the position would be paid according to a 
winner-take-all tournament, compete with two employees from other firms. The other two 
are paid according to a piece rate. Employees could send a costly signal to indicate their 
willingness to compete but are not guaranteed to get the place. In the Baseline treatment of 
promotion game, employers make the decision based on the signal and demographic 
characteristics. In the No Selection treatment, the decision is made by the computer, 
randomly select a person who expressed the willingness to compete. If no one asks for the 
promotion, the computer would randomly choose one. In the No Signal, employers make 
the decision only based on demographic characteristic while workers can’t send signals. 
Thus, only the gender differences in attitudes toward competition could affect the 
promotion decision of No Selection treatment. 
The raw gender gaps in Baseline, No Selection, No Signal are: 41.66 %, 25 %, and 9.1 %, 
respectively. Hence the highest and only significant gap occurs when employees could send 
signal and employers have the right to choose. The gender gap is almost not existent when 
workers are unable express their willingness to compete and employers select only 
according to individual characteristics. Women are significantly less likely to send signals 
than men. The gender gaps in Baseline and No Selection are quite similar: 27.77 % and 
  57 
26.22 %, respectively. Compare these two treatments, the authors conclude that gender 
matters only when employers can select as female think they are subject to potential 
discrimination. In both treatments, the sending decision could be explained by risk 
preferences. Compare the Baseline treatment with No Signal treatment, the authors argue 
that employees who send signals are significantly more often to be promoted and employers 
discriminate against women if they are able to send signals but don’t ask for the promotion.  
Heinz et al. (2016) find that employers determine the wage as in a dictator game. Gender 
discrimination is non-existent if employees select tournament or let the computer do the 
decision. However, women who choose to be paid by piece rate earn significant less both in 
employee share (18 % versus 36 %) and income (2.03 vs. 3.09 euros) even no gender 
differences in performances, regardless of compensation schemes. As women are less likely 
to apply for tournament (40 % versus 64 %), this discrimination behavior of employers 
widens the pay gap. 
Dasgupta et al.(2015) evaluate the self-selection into the six-month training program 
provided by NGO which aims at improving sewing skills of Indian women aged between 18 
and 39 by providing stitching and tailoring courses. It’s compulsory to spend 10 hours every 
week. They argue that socioeconomic background and demographic characteristics can’t 
fully explain the differences in self-selection. Women who are more risk prone and 
competitive apply for the program more often than those who are not. Risk preferences 
have a pronounced effect possibly due to the imperfect and underdeveloped financial 
market in developing countries. This paper should be noted as findings could be applied to 
other developing countries. First, the sample is representative of the population structure in 
developing countries. Second, people live in developing countries, women in particular, 
usually have low levels of human capital and hence low levels of productivity. Thus, this 
kind of training program which could would be more relevant and beneficial for women 
from developing countries than their male counterpart and women from economically 
advanced countries. Last but not least, garment factories now relocated in developing 
countries and offer a lot of job opportunities for women who used to be exclude from local 
labor market. Figuring out the mechanism could better promote gender equality, boost 
economic growths and reduce global inequality to get sustainable development under way. 
4.2.4 Policy implication 
Niederle et al.(2013) introduce a gender quota which requires at least one of the winners 
must be women in experiment to evaluate its effect. Participants are divided into 6-people 
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gender balanced groups. There’re two types of tournament, standard tournament (the top 2 
performers would be winners) and affirmative action tournament (the top 2 performers 
would be winners, but at least one of them must be women), AA tournament for short. 
There’re 6 treatments: piece rate; standard tournament; choose piece rate or standard 
tournament for personal performance in treatment 3; choose piece rate or AA tournament 
for personal performance in treatment 4; choose piece rate or standard tournament for 
personal performance in treatment 1; choose piece rate or AA tournament for personal 
performance in treatment 1. The first four treatments are real-effort tasks, the last two 
treatments don’t require subjects to really perform task. Thus, gender differences in entry 
tournament caused by competition preferences are eliminated in the last 2 treatments. After 
controlling for the chance of winning and confidence, the difference in the final two choices, 
is a measure of the effect of mentioning affirmative action. 
The quota policy makes competition more gender-specific: a woman wins if she is either 
the best female performers or among the two best performers in the group, but a man needs 
to be not only be the best male performers but also among the two best performing 
participants in the group. In consistent with previous studies (Niederle and Vesterlund, 
2007), without quota, high-performing women don’t enter the tournament enough and this 
could be attributed to gender differences in confidence and competition preference. 
In the standard tournament, the largest gender gap in tournament entry appears among those 
participants who would earn more if they choose standard tournament rather than piece rate: 
among those who have higher expected earnings in the tournament than in the piece, all 
men and only one-third of the women enter the tournament. As expected, affirmative action 
substantially increases tournament entry by women and deter men from entering 
tournament. This time, women who can benefit from tournament, all choose to enter AA 
tournament. The introduced quota boosts women’s confidence significantly.  
Next, Niederle et al. (2013) assess the cost of affirmative action. In the standard tournament, 
winners on average solve 19.2 questions correctly, while in the AA tournament, the number 
is 18.7. This difference is not significant. Niederle et al.(2013) evaluate both ex ante cost 
and ex post cost. The ex ante assess expected effect of quota if participants don’t change 
their behaviors. The ex post evaluates realized costs of affirmative action, in which quota 
policy is announced and individuals have adjust their behaviors accordingly.  
Niederle et al. (2013) also contend that quota doesn’t cause efficiency loss as the pool of 
high performing participants is rarely affected. Even though some high performing men are 
dropped out, some high performing women are encouraged to enter the tournament by the 
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quota. Therefore, the ex posts performance costs decrease substantially. Quota is also 
criticized due to possible reverse discrimination by lowering the standards. However, in this 
analysis, the requirement is almost same for winning the tournament with and without quota, 
thus there’s limited space for reverse discrimination. By contrast, ex ante costs are 
expensive, which imply the importance of making quota public. 
Balafoutas et al. (2016) compare the effects of gender quota and color quota. In color quota, 
people are divided into Team Green and Team Pink, while members of Team Pink benefit 
from the quota policy. The quota isn’t compulsory, participants could demonstrate their 
attitudes by voting. Voting is either costless or require participants to pay 1 euro. The quota 
would only be implemented if over half of subjects agree to this policy. On the one hand, 
advantaged (disadvantaged) subjects support (oppose) the policy more often when voting 
doesn’t require participants to pay anything and almost all (92.9 %) women support the 
gender quota. In contrast, only 57.8 % of participants who belong to Team Pink agree to the 
color quota. On the other hand, when voting is costly, both the ratio of female supporters 
(46.7 %) in the gender quota and of pink supporters (28.9 %) decrease. Overall, imposing 
costs reduces the proportion of disadvantaged people who vote against AA by over 60 
percentage points. 
The mean performance in the gender quota slightly decreases from 9.22 to 8.49 but the 
difference is insignificant (p = 0.46). Moreover, both genders don’t change their behaviors. 
While in the color quota, of which the criterion is arbitrary, gain less support and cause 
efficiency losses. In the absence of color quota, on average, participants need to solve 11.75 
problems correctly to win. With the implantation of costly voting and color quota, the 
threshold lowers to 10.73 and the difference is marginally significant (p = 0.07). People in 
pink groups perform significantly better from 7.33 to 8.96 (p < 0.01) when AA is enforced, 
while the disadvantaged perform significantly worse from 9.81 to 8.43 (p = 0.03). This 
paper implies that the effects and efficiency of quota policies largely depend on whether 
these policies are viewed favorably within the affected groups. 
However, results of papers which analyze the impacts of existing quota policies are less 
optimistic than researchers’ prediction based on laboratory experiments. Besley et al. (2017) 
evaluate the effects of gender quotas adopted by Social Democratic in 1993 on the 
competence of party members. Unlike other papers which use educational attainment or 
income, this analysis introduces a novel approach: an individual’s earnings relative to 
people of similar age and similar labor-market characteristics. They argue that this new 
measure is able to predicts political success for politicians and have strong and positive 
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associations with enlistment tests correlates and with policy success. Results show that the 
increase in competence of candidates is driven by the new way to select male politicians 
which force mediocre male leaders to resign, while there are no significant changes in 
female competence. 
Ahern and Dittmar explore the gender quota which adopted in Norway in 2003 and requires 
that two-fifths of Norwegian firms’ directors be female. The number was only 9% at that 
moment. They maintain that this quota policy lead to a dramatic decrease in the stock price 
upon announcing and a significant drop in Tobin’s Q over the following years. Companies 
increase the share of female directors by reducing the number of male directors as there are 
no large changes in the average size of corporate boards. The new female directors are less 
experienced as only 31.1 % of them have CEO experience, compare with retained male 
directors (69.41%), existing male directors (65.2%) and retained female directors (43%). 
The new female directors are also younger (45.8 years old), compare with the exiting male 
directors (52.9 years), the retained male directors (54.1 years), and the retained female 
directors (48.2 years). By comparing the male directors who left and who retained, the 
authors conclude that firms value older and more experienced directors. The analysis shows 
that a 20% increase in female share results in a near 12 percentage points reduction in the 
ratio of directors who have CEO experience. 
5. Relative importance 
Gender differences in competitiveness have been replicated in many papers which use the 
same or slightly changed experimental designs. However, the relative importance of this 
emerging explanation is not remarkable as it was in the lab. Also, there’re several unclear 
questions remain to be figured out. In this section, I will first go through several papers 
which assess and compare the effect of different factors in explaining gender pay gap. Then 
I will list existing problems and difficulties which further research should take into account 
and enrich this theory. So far we have been talking about the advantages of being 
competitive, choose a more prestigious major, have a higher possibility to be promoted, etc. 
However, competitive people may be more likely to engaged in tasks which beyond them, 
too. Therefore, in the final part, I will introduce some negative sides of competition. 
5.1 Relative importance 
Blau and Kahn (2017) use published data to explore the gender pay gap in US and argue 
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that even though psychological factors such as gender differences in competition preference 
provide a new perspective, the quantitative evidences show that these factors only 
contribute to a small to moderate portion of gender pay gap. The impacts are smaller than 
that of occupation and industry, which could be affected by psychological factors, though. 
They take educational attainment and labor market experience as 2 measures of human 
capital. In 1981, on average, men had nearly 7 more years of full-time work experience than 
women do. By 2011, the gap is only 1.4 years. At the same time, women study longer than 
man and are more likely to hold an advanced degree. They state that by 2010, the traditional 
reason, that is, human capital now only explained little of the gender pay gap: 
female-to-male log wage ratio is from 79.3 % with no adjustment to 82.1 % after 
controlling human capital. The full specification, in which variables such as race, 
occupation, industry and collective bargaining are included, the ratio is 91.6 % and 
considerably higher than 82.1 %. This result suggests gender differences in occupation and 
industry continued to be important in explaining gender pay gap. Using the Oaxaca–Blinder 
decomposition, they show that in human capital specification, male advantage in experience 
contribute about 25 % of the gap in 1980 while this number reduces to 16 % in 2010 as the 
reversal of schoolings. These figures are quite similar in the full specification which 
suggests that the impact of human capital operates primarily within industries and 
occupations. The portion of gaps that could be explained by the differences in industry and 
occupation increases substantially: nearly 20 % in 1980 and over a half in 2010, making 
occupation and industries the two most relevant factors for the gender pay gap. In the full 
specification, the unexplained factors remain to account for a remarkable share of gender 
gap: 49 % in 1980 and 38 % in 2010.  
In order to better understand the exact effects of changes in the unexplained factors and 
other coefficients on changes in the gender wage gap, Blau and Kahn (2017) adopt an 
approach developed by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991). In the human capital specification, 
women’s improvements in education and experience together help narrow about 38 % - 
40 % of the gender pay gap. Therefore, human capital did play a relevant role in explaining 
the wage gap. In the full specification, changes in occupation, industry and unionism in 
total close about 26 % of the gender gap. Women shift from administrative and services jobs 
to managerial and professional jobs. The role of unions in accounting for gender differences 
in wages has virtually disappeared, as have gender differences in unionization. However, in 
contrast with the convergence in occupation and union status, gender differences in industry 
remain. In both specifications, the decline in the unexplained factors account for 58% of the 
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closing. It’s an open question what factors contribute to the reduction. Based on the results 
of Blau and Kahn (2006), Blau and Kahn (2017) attribute to decrease in discrimination, 
gender differences in unobservable characteristics and changes in labor demand. 
Moreover, the gender pay gap declined much more slowly at the top-income level than at 
the middle or bottom and by 2010 was noticeably higher at the top. Women’s career 
interruptions and fewer working hours remain significant in high-skilled occupations, 
possibly due to compensating differentials. Gender differences in occupations and industries, 
as well as differences in gender roles and the gender division of labor remain relevant, and 
research based on experimental evidence strongly suggests that discrimination cannot be 
discounted.  
Goldin (2014) finds that the gender pay gap is much lower than it used to be and the decline 
could be attributed to an decrease in gender gap in human capital as education at all levels 
increased for women relative to men. The gradually converged human capital investments 
of both genders make the remaining unexplained portion rise relatively. Therefore, the 
author develops a framework which shows that the position with the highest output per unit 
time is also the one with the highest penalty with regard to reduced hours. An employee 
who wants work shorter hours would turn to jobs that have a lower penalty but also a lower 
output per unit time. If worker keeps pursuing the shorter work times, eventually they 
would take the reservation job, of which pay with respect to hours is completely linear.  
In this paper, job flexibility includes the number of hours, precise times, predictability and 
ability to schedule one’s own hours as not only the length of work times matter, but also 
employers want their employees to work at the particular moment and work continuously. If 
it’s easy for an employee to switch to other similar jobs without costs, then there is no 
premium in earnings with respect to the number or the timing of hours, which is linear. If 
not, then pay with respect to work time tends to be with nonlinearity.  
This compensating differentials model explains earning differences caused by the costs of 
flexibility. Hence it supports that cross occupation earning differences is due to productivity 
differences in the workplace, rather than differences in human capital. Goldin (2014) use 
business (which I will discuss in detail below) and law-related occupations as the one with 
stiff punishment for reduced work times and pharmacy as jobs which have linear elasticity 
of earnings with regard to work times. 
By focusing on MBAs graduates from the University of Chicago from 1990 to 2006, 
Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010) find that there’s no significant gender pay gap at the 
beginning of their career, but the gender earning differences soon emerge and then develop: 
  63 
there’s a 30 log point difference in annual earnings at five years after MBA study, grows to 
60 log points (namely women earn 45 % less than men do) at 10 to 16 years graduation. 
Three factors which can explain 84% of the gap are: 1) (24 % explained by) pre-MBA 
training, such as finance courses; 2) (30 % explained by) career interruptions and job 
experience, career interruption refers to six-month or longer period during which the subject 
is not working; 3) (30 % explained by) weekly working hours. Thus, Goldin (2014) 
concludes that about two third of the penalty from job interruptions is due to take any time 
out. 
At 10 to 16 years after the completion of MBA, 23 % of female graduates who stay in the 
labor market work part-time and, interestingly, over half of those part-time female workers 
are self-employed. Around 17 % of female graduates are not currently employed. In 
contrast, less than 1 % of males are not working in any following year. About 92 % to 94 % 
of males work full-time in any given post-graduation year but the ratio of females from 
89 % at the outset of career but reduces to 62 % 10 years later. For women who have child, 
this ratio is even lower as 52 %. The portion of males who had at least one career 
interruption is 4 % one year after graduation and 10 % at 10 years after graduation. The 
corresponding figures for women are 9 % and 41 %. On average, the cumulative 
not-work-year of women is 0.28 years by 6th year, and 0.57 years by 9th; for men, the 
numbers are 0.07 and 0.10. Ten years or more after graduation, the figures are 1.05 for 
women and just 0.12 for men. 
Child is the main reason for changes in female labor supply. Women with children work 24 
percent fewer hours per week than men or than women who are childless. The magnitudes 
of children effect depend on spousal incomes. MBA moms who marry high-earning 
husbands are 18.5 % less likely to enter labor market than those who marry low-income 
husbands. If MBA moms who marry high-income husbands work, their working hour is 
only 81 % of work time of those who have low-income spouses. 
The impact of the first birth on female labor supply increase over time. For working women, 
their working hours and participation decrease by 17 % and 13 % respectively one year 
after the first birth, and increase to 24 % and 18 % three or four years later. Some women 
with children have difficulties in work-life balance if work is quite inflexible.  
Goldin (2014) criticizes that both field and laboratory experiments which show that women 
are more competition averse usually forget to take jobs that value competition the most. The 
author argues that these types of jobs have such following features: 1) Pay with respect to 
working hours is highly convex. 2) Employees who work longer are more likely to receive 
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the reward; 3) Working hours alone, could be awarded. Therefore, staying in these positions 
and work continuously might have a much larger effect than the willingness to compete. In 
line with Blau and Kahn (2017), the author maintains that the majority of the current gender 
pay gap results from within occupation earnings differences rather than from between 
occupation differences. The within occupation gender pay gap is largely explained by the 
emphasis put on the work times and job continuity of employees. The gender gap is low in 
occupations which earnings are linear with respect to work time; the gender gap is larger 
when there is nonlinearity. 
To summarize, both Bertand (2011) and Niederle (2016) argue that studies which attempt to 
establish the empirical relevance of competitiveness for economic outcomes usually fail to 
detect significant effects found in the lab. This also applies to some papers which use lab 
experiment but don’t find the similarly substantial gender gap (38 %) in Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007). The economical meanings for actual outcomes remain to be determined.  
5.2 Unsolved Issues 
Bertand (2011) calls for the robustness checks which take repetition and learning into 
account. Several papers have shown that to some extent socialization shapes the 
competition preferences. The boost in female labor force participation rate shakes up the 
traditional female roles: homemaker and caregiver. However, in most papers, experiments 
are one-shot. Even in a few of them, subjects are tracked over time, those analyses don’t 
record the change in competition preference and the measure of competitiveness solely 
bases on results of an experiment several years ago. It’s straightforward that women might 
reduce work times after having a baby, but would they become more unwilling to compete 
because they need to take care of their babies or become more competitive to fight for more 
resources to feed their babies? Hence, Future work should look into the question of how this 
trait evolves over time. When analyze time series data, specific changes in environments, 
such as quota policy, labor demand changes and technological advances are unneglectable.  
The second issue is to what degree gender composition could affect participants’ 
preferences. Stereotype threat has strongest impacts when women perform a task which is 
considered to favor men in mixed environment. At the first glance, Gneezy et al. (2003) 
seems to document that women only react to competition in a single sex environment. 
However, after in-depth analysis, it’s the compensation scheme rather than gender 
competition that change women’s behaviors. Hogarth et al. (2012) measure the 
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competitiveness by the leave decision instead. For women, the chances of making wrong 
leave decisions decrease when more women present. When the proportion of women in 
group is about 65 %, the probability of incorrect withdrawal is approximately the same for 
women and men. If the ratio keeps increasing, men would make more false exit decision. 
Price (2008) shows that women only start to compete when the ratio exceeds 58%.  
Further research need to investigate competition preferences in high-stake experiment. 
There are several ways to do it. First, researchers could conduct experiments in developing 
countries where the pricing level is much lower. However, people from developing 
countries usually have low educational level, which makes researchers have to adopt simple 
tasks or enlarge sample size if they insist on complex tasks such as calculation. The cost 
advantages is about to disappear if more participants are recruited. Second, researchers 
could use opportunity cost of attending the specific university. For example, Ors et al. (2013) 
show the average salary of HEC alumni. The corresponding weakness is that researchers 
can’t detect risk preferences of participants. Third, look into TV shows which involve real 
and substantial payoffs and participants of different backgrounds. However, TV channels 
usually seek public attention which could recruit participants selectively and exaggerate the 
conflict. Also, future studies should aim to confirm that competition preferences have 
independent effects, rather than reflections of already identified attributes such as risk 
attitudes and social preferences.  
Niederle (2016) points out two methodological issues when studying gender differences in 
competitiveness: First, unlike traditional economic experiments, this type of experiments 
usually require participants to put effort in performing tasks such as calculation or solve 
mazes, while it’s complicated to measure participants’ efforts. For example, if women bear 
higher costs in improving performance, then one can expect that women might choose to 
put less effort as payoffs are quite small( in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), winners only 
get 2 dollars for each correctly solved problem in tournament). Furthermore, it’s unknown 
the how efforts affect performance. If efforts are not sensitive to performance, which means 
a low elasticity, then changes in compensation schemes may only lead to changes in efforts. 
Charness, Gneezy and Henderson (2018) assert that a skill or ability task would lead to 
greater variance in performance, hence larger sample sizes are needed. Skills may be 
positively correlated with utility of performing task, therefore less cost of effort. That’s why 
different tasks which, according to stereotype, favor different group of people are used. A 
lot of related papers attribute the performance improvement from piece rate to tournament 
to learning, which is also a problem. Participants may improve at translating effort into 
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productivity over time. 
Second, not only the gender of the participant but also the gender of the other subjects 
matter. There’re several solutions. Some researchers try not to mention any thing about 
gender before, during and after experiments which might let participants unaware that they 
are taking part in a sex related experiment. The other way is to allow participants to see 
people in their groups, and then they can determine the gender of their competitors.  
Also Niederle (2016) state that results of field experiments, mirror results in the lab though, 
cannot directly assess the role this newly developed explanation play in explaining for 
gender differences in educational or labor market outcomes.  
First, the representativeness of sample is unknown. In this field experiments, participants 
are drawn from nonstandard subject pool. Field evidence on this certain group of people, 
such as gender differences among Tanzanian entrepreneurs, may have limited applicability 
to American entrepreneurs or general population in Tanzania. Also, gender difference in a 
trait doesn’t mean it’s the cause of gender pay gap among this group of people, let alone 
among general population. External validity just shows this trait still exists outside of the 
lab, while is insufficient to conclude this trait is important for educational and labor market 
outcomes.  
Enlarging sample size might result in different findings. For instance, both 9-12 years old 
Swedish kids in Cárdenas et al. (2012) and 7-10 years old Swedish kids in Dreber et al. 
(2011) are asked to perform running and rope skipping task. Both of these two papers find 
no gender differences in running competition while in Cárdenas et al.(2012), girls are more 
competitive when skip rope. Cárdenas et al. (2012) attribute the differences in results to 
their lager sample size. Niederle (2016) consider Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988) as a useful tool 
for evaluating the economical relevance in differences between male and female means.  
On the other hand, Fréchette (2016) assert that unlike students, the nonstandard subjects 
allow researchers to better test the robustness of findings and understand the nature of this 
certain group. Experiments which use representative sample have four main disadvantages. 
First, the high cost. The cost of recruiting students is lower than recruiting average men. 
Thus the same amount of money might generate different incentives for different people, 
reduce the validity of results. Large sample size would make the experiment less affordable. 
Second, the low availability. It’s much easier to recruit students while researchers are lack 
of access to representative people. Those two factors combined result in the third problem: 
low replicability. Last but not least, the limits to control the experimental environment. 
Subjects may understand the instructions in a different way, introducing noise in the 
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observed data. In order to make sure that every participant understands and complete 
regardless of literacy, the optional tasks are limited. Experiments conducted in developing 
countries are usually physical and easy tasks, such as throw balls into bucket (Gneezy et al., 
2009) or arrange shapes of small wooden blocks (Flory et al., 2018).  
Second, it’s relatively difficult to find field evidence, based on existing data. Thus, further 
studies need to combine good measures of competitiveness with real world outcomes in 
databases. For example, in some papers, competitiveness degrees are measured by the 
degree of consent to one competition-related question. Hence, create data sets which 
include both laboratory and field measures would be helpful for determining the 
explanatory power of this psychological trait.  
5.3 Is competitiveness a desirable trait? 
5.3.1 Efficiency Loss and Individual Wellbeing 
Competitive people may gain more disutility from losing the competition. Also social 
comparison could put competitive people under huge pressure and hence hurt mental health 
and personal wellbeing. Grasseni et al. (2018) study the relationship of competition 
preferences, positionality and individual wellbeing. People who are competitive may 
concern about their relative position in the society and compare themselves to others more 
frequently. In this paper, competition preferences are measured by to what degree 
participants agree with the following two statements:1) Competition is good because it 
motivate people to work harder and ignite new ideas; 2) A person be rich only by 
sabotaging others. The first statement considers competition as positive sum game while the 
second considers competition as zero-sum game. Participants are therefore grouped into 
three types: positive, negative, remaining. Wellbeing information is collected by the survey 
which includes questions about life satisfaction and about satisfaction with interpersonal 
relationships. Participants are asked about evaluate their positional concerns with income, 
leisure, education, etc. 
They find that distaste for competition increases the probability of being positional, 
especially on income while a positive attitude toward competition increases life satisfaction. 
There are no gender differences in competition preferences. However, distaste for 
competition is detrimental for women. The adverse effect of negative opinions of 
competition is stronger for women and the positive effect of competition preferences is 
stronger for man. They don’t find correlations between the degrees of positionality and 
  68 
happiness.  
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) shows that, from the society’s point of view, there’s 
efficiency loss due to the under-entry of high ability women and over-entry of low ability 
men. People who may irrational decision also suffer losses which could be avoided if they 
switch to another payment methods.  
Eckel et al. (2015) study the relationship between gender composition and price bubbles. 
Basing on the assumption that men are more risk prone and competitive, they hypothesize 
that all-male market would generate larger bubbles. Results show that in financial asset 
markets run by female traders, bubbles don’t occur. In some of them, there’re even negative 
bubbles. They adopt an original approach, that is, Type A personality theory13, to assess the 
competitiveness of participants. They do find that competitiveness seems to contribute to 
the bubbles even they don’t detect any significant gender differences in competitiveness.  
5.3.2 Cheating and Lying 
Schwieren et al. (2010) study the relationship of competition and cheating. In the 
experiments, subjects are required to solve maze under noncompetitive and competitive 
context and self report the number of solved mazes to the experimenter. Subjects could take 
advantage of several tools to improve their results:1) indicate a larger number to the 
experimenter; 2) let the computer solve mazes by press the Auto-Solve button; 3) use 
instructive Path-Verify function; 4) modify the difficulty level. Consider subjects as a whole, 
they find no significant changes in the frequency of cheating, from 37.5 % to 42.4 %. 
However, women experience a dramatic increase in the frequency of cheating: from 29. 4 % 
to 60 % while men behave similar in the two contexts. The most popular way to cheat is to 
overstate their performance: 31 % in the non-competitive and 39 % in the competitive 
treatment. The authors argue that the increase in frequency and the way of the cheating 
behavior is entirely due to poor performance rather than sex. In both treatments, women 
solve mazes significantly fewer than men (22.19 versus 29). Bad performing participants 
might feel ashamed and therefore save face by cheating. 
Similarly, Faravelli er al.(2015) require subjects to perform calculation tasks in three 
environments:1) self report the performance and be paid according to piece rate; 2) compete 
with another one and be paid according to self-stated performance; 3) choose one 
compensation scheme. Consistent with Schwieren et al. (2010), they report that competitive 
environment elicits more dishonesty behaviors, both the number of liars and the differences 
                                                        
13 For details, see Friedman (1996).  
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between stated and actual performance increase. Moreover, people who cheat choose 
tournaments more often than honest people. However, there’s no significant output 
difference between piece rate and tournament due to the high output of honest people.  
Therefore, if competitiveness increases the likelihoods of cheating which mainly done by 
less productive people, then the gap in productivity would be broadened, making it harder 
to cheat and finally lead to reputational damage which participants definitely want to avoid. 
5.3.3 Cooperation and Sabotage 
If agents view competition as zero-sum game, then agents would be less willing to 
cooperate and more likely to do sabotage to make their stand out.  
Dato et al. (2014) conduct a experiment which allow participants to decide the number they 
want to be deducted from their competitors’ achieved points before each period starts. 
Participants get one point for each correct answer and compete in 2-people group. Each 
treatment consists of 8 periods. After each period, agents acquire information about their 
points after deduction, their choice of sabotage and the result of competition. The output of 
two people determined the payment of the third party, which is known by participants. 
There are four treatments: 1) Baseline; 2) Belief: like Baseline treatment, but participants 
are also asked about their beliefs about performance and the amount of sabotage they suffer; 
3) Cheating: like Baseline treatment, but now the number is added to the participants’ own 
points rather than deducted from competitors’ points. 4) Gender: like Baseline treatment, 
but the gender of the opponent is revealed before treatment. They find no gender 
differences in performance except in the Gender treatment, in which men significantly 
outperform women in mixed groups. Males not only select significantly higher number but 
also believe that their opponent would choose larger sabotage. In the Baseline treatment, 
the average number of chosen sabotage is 26.66 points for men and 12.99 points for women, 
this is a substantial gap considering the achieved points are 114.87 for men and 111.43 for 
women. They don’t find any significant gender differences in risk preferences, probably 
due to the homogeneity of the sample group. They also rule out the possibility of gender 
differences in human value and social preference.  
The belief male participants hold that they would suffer severe loss needs to be treated with 
caution as it only explains the gender differences in sabotage decision to some extent, the 
authors maintain an additional explanation: joy of winning. Some agents would gain 
additional, and under most circumstances, non-monetary utility from winning a tournament. 
Men have higher likelihoods of winning but profits are not significantly different from that 
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of women because sabotage is costly. 
Cárdenas et al. (2015) study the relationship of competitiveness and cooperativeness 
among young children and report the willingness to compete in a math task is correlated 
negatively with cooperativeness.   
5.4 Robustness check: public observability 
Experiments, both in the lab and field study, are typically conducted in anonymous 
environments. However it’s not the case in real world, where competitions are often public 
and hence result in concerns about social image. If women care more about their social 
images than men, this could widen the gender gap. For example, women may shy away 
from competition because they view competitiveness as an aggressive and inappropriate 
characteristic for females. Therefore Buser et al. (2017) design an experiment to assess the 
effects of observability on the willingness to compete. Overall the experimental design 
closely follows Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) but insert an annoucement part between 
decision-making and task-performing. Subjects don’t know their relative performance 
during the experiment. After participants pin down which compensation scheme they want 
to apply for their performance, participants in the Public Choice group need to announce 
their first names and their choices in front of the public. Participants in the Control group 
only need to announce their first names while Participants in the Public Outcome group 
only need to announce their decisions. Participants in the Private are not required to do 
anything.  
Then participants would participate in a mock interview to decide whether candidates are 
qualified for an internship at a bank based on the CV and how they feel about these 
candidates. They manipulate the gender, competitiveness level and other demographic 
characteristics of candidates to elicit their attitudes toward competition as an outsider.  
Overall men are much more likely to enter the tournament (57 % vs. 22 %) and have better 
performance under piece rate and the tournament. In the Control treatment, the chance of 
tournament entry is 55 % for men and 23 % for women. In the Private treatment, both 
genders are more likely to enter (61 % for men and 28 % for women) but the gender gap is 
similar to that in the Control treatment, which suggests introducing oneself has no effects 
on gender differences in competition. In the Public Choice treatment, the gender gap is 
39 % and in the Public Outcome treatment, the gender gap is 26 %. As hypothesized, 
women are slightly less likely to select competition when names and choices are public and 
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men are slightly less likely to opt for competition when choices become public. However, 
the public observability only has limited effect, in terms of size and statistical significance.  
In the mock interview, participants are less willing to work with or hire highly competitive 
individuals, regardless of their gender. Hence there’s no evident backlash against women.  
5.5 Robustness check: repetition of competition 
5.5.1 Performance 
In existing studies, competition is usually one-shot, while in real world competition is 
continuous and repeated. 
Cotton et al. (2013) conduct five-round competition. Student participants are matched with 
another classmate and answer math quizzes in 5 minute, only the person who solve more 
questions correctly within the time limit would be rewarded. If both solve the same amount 
of questions correctly before running out of time, the person who submits earlier would 
win. Plus, in the treatment group the winner could get a bonus as he submits before the 
time limit. In each round, participants are paired with a new opponent. There is a short 
break between each competition and the whole experiment takes about one hour. 
Participants know neither individual performance nor relative performance. There are two 
types of control groups: the one answer math quiz but without time pressure and the other 
do the same as the treatment group but answer 10-question reading quiz. At the beginning 
of the experiment, participants are informed of the number of rounds, the number and 
sources of questions, the identity of their competitor, procedure for determining their 
competitors and winners in each round. The questions of quizzes are randomly drawn from 
state assessment, as the scores could serve as a baseline of gender differences.  
The quiz is 5 questions for 4 classrooms, 10 questions for 5 classrooms, 15 questions for 3 
classrooms. Two weeks later, the 4 classrooms whose students answer the 5-question quiz 
participate in the competition in the second period and the number of questions remains 
unchanged.  
The variable of interest is the student’s score in each round, which could be affected by 
innate ability and gender of the student and gender of his competitor. The innate ability in 
certain round could be influenced by performance of the student in other rounds, while 
performance of the student in other round is, in reverse, influenced by innate ability and 
competition preference. Therefore they use the prior year’s state assessment score as an 
instrument for innate ability. As questions are also drawn from the state assessment, the 
  72 
prior scores tell about student’s performance when in the non-competitive environment. 
In the first round, male students outperform equally able female students significantly with 
the male coefficient equals to 0.34. Males perform somehow better when competing in a 
single-sex context. Similarly, females perform slightly better when they are paired with 
another female. The gender of the competitor only has limited effect on both genders’ 
performance. The results are in line with previous studies which only conduct experiment 
once.  
However, the male advantage only emerges at the first round and disappearing in the 
following four rounds. Males even perform worse than females of similar ability. The 
coefficient on male in the second round is −0.01 while ability has a stronger effect. Female 
performance decrease when move to the second round, while increase in the last three 
rounds. Females perform significantly better in the last three rounds than in the first two 
rounds. Men, however, decrease dramatically when moving to the second round (p-value < 
0.001), and the performance is slowly improved in the following rounds. Further analysis 
show that the male advantage is caused by the overperformance of low-ability males and 
underperformance of high-ability females. For all quiz lengths, the male advantage only 
appears in the first round, with the largest appear in classrooms whose students are asked to 
solve 15 questions. Compare with females, males solve more questions while has a similar 
accuracy rate. In the first round of 15-question quiz, males solve 1.6 more questions (p = 
0.036) but no gender difference in correct rate. In the following rounds, males answer 0.14 
additional questions and the accuracy rate is only 1 percentage point higher than females in 
the first round. They argue that the closed and reversed gender gap is not because students 
view the task unimportant and therefore treat it as non-competition.  
There’s no significant gender difference in performance in the 2-week later competition. 
The coefficient on male is either zero or positive, both are significant. Therefore they 
conclude that male advantage disappeared for at least two weeks after the initial 
competition, and if it appears again, the magnitude is much smaller. 
There is a control group to explore performance and gender gap without time pressure, that 
is, students won’t get bonus from submitting before time runs out. Results show that there’s 
no gender difference in performance in all five round, hence the authors argue that time 
pressure is important for the emergence of the initial male advantage and that females 
perform better in a competitive environment without time pressure. Moreover, the accuracy 
rate is higher (on average, 65 %) as the highest correct rate is 61% when students perform 
under time pressure. In this setting, students concentrate on skill rather than put undue 
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emphasis on speed.  
For students who answer the reading quiz, the female advantage appears in the first round 
and persists across five rounds. These results show that any gender differences in the 
reading treatment do not change across periods of competition. However, there’s no gender 
difference in response to competition as the gender gap in performance is almost same as 
the gender gap in reading part of prior state assessment. Combined the results found in two 
control groups, the authors maintain that both the design of the competition (with or 
without time pressure) and the task (math or reading) are crucial for the gender differences 
in competition.  
5.5.2 Response to failure 
Buser et al. (2018) build a connection between lab and Dutch Math Olympiad to examine 
the effect of past failure on re-entry to the competition. The lab experiment bases on the 
approach developed by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) while students are divided into 
three groups which receive different treatment: main, feedback and risk.  
The Main treatment is composed of six rounds. In each round, participants are matched 
with another new person without knowing the identity of their opponent and decide which 
compensation scheme (piece rate or tournament) they would like to apply to their 
performance. At the end of each round, only participants who opt for competition know 
their individual performance and the result of competition. 
In the Feedback treatment, the only differences are that participants who select the piece 
rate now would receive same feedback as participants who opt for competition as they 
would be paired with a hypothetical opponent and that there are only four rounds.  
In the Risk treatment, the winner of competition is randomly determined. Participants who 
choose the competition would 2 points with probability x and nothing with probability 1-x 
(x=0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 and is fixed during the treatment) for each correct answer. Before 
getting started, participants are told about their probability x. The question of interest in the 
lab is: how would participants react to the outcomes of competition in the first round?  
In the Main treatment, both males and females who win the competition in the first round 
insist on their choice in the following five rounds and there’s no gender difference in 
response to the initial victory (4.6 out of 5 times for men and 4.2 out of 5 times for women). 
However, males and females react to losing in a very different way. On average males enter 
2.6 times while women only enter 1.1 times (p = 0.04). The gender difference in the 
response to the failure is still significant after conditioning on to controlling for absolute 
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and relative performance. Compare with male winners, males losers are 24 % less likely to 
re-enter in the subsequent competition while females losers are about 59 % less likely. The 
initial failure has almost no effect on high-performing men14 while strongly discouraged 
high-performing women from re-entering, the probability is 56 percentage points lower 
than high-performing female winners. 
The reactions to competition are similar for both genders in the Feedback treatment. On 
average, men enter 2.9 times and women enter 2.8 times in the following three rounds if 
they win the competition. Women who experience failure are also much less likely to 
re-enter than men (1.5 vs. 0.6, p = 0.02). The propensity of participating in the subsequent 
competition for male losers reduced by 28 % while for female the data reduced by 56 %. 
For participants who opt for the piece rate but lose, there’s no gender difference in response. 
Men enter the competition 0.2 times and women enter 0.3 times. However, males who 
perform better than their opponent in the piece rate enter the competition more frequently 
than women (2.4 vs. 1.5; p = 0.02). Piece rate male winners are 56 % more likely to enter 
the tournament, while the number for women is only 28 %. The gap even widens among 
high-performing participants.  
In the Risk treatment, men are 21 % more likely to engage in the risky competition, this 
gender gap in tournament entry decreases and are no longer significant over the following 
rounds. For participants who opt for the competition in the first round, the gender gaps in 
tournament entry over the subsequent competition disappear. For participants who choose 
the safe piece rate in round 1, female are even more likely to take risk from round 2 
onwards. Findings of Risk treatment suggest that risk attitudes don’t play a role in 
tournament entry.  
In both Main and Feedback treatments, the largest gender differences in the response to 
failure appear in round 2, and gradually decrease in the subsequent rounds but persist. The 
differences are not result from gender differences in confidence, belief updating, 
performance improvement, and risk attitudes. The initial failure has a strong adverse affect 
on competition preference for female loses in the round 1 competition. Consistent with 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), high-performing women bear higher under-entry cost than 
men. Among top 25 % of participants, women lose 57 cents per round while men lose 35 
cents.  
The Dutch Math Olympiad is an annually math competition and the ultimate goal is to 
select a national team for the International Mathematics Olympiad. Students in tenth or 
                                                        
14 In this paper, high-perform participants refer to the group of people whose chance of winning exceeds 50%. 
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eleventh grade could register for the campaign. There are two rounds of competition and 
only a fixed amount of top performers could proceed to the second period of competition. 
However, only tenth grade students could register again in the next year no matter how 
their performance is. This institutional setting allows the author to do regression 
discontinuity design.  
Among 11,591 candidates, 63.1 % of them are boys which in line with Buser et al. (2014) 
and Buser et al. (2017) that girls are less willingness to compete in mathematical areas. 
14.4 % of male candidates and 9.0 % of female candidates advance to the second round. 
The probability of advancing is almost identical (91 % for men vs. 89.4 % for women) after 
controlling for performance. However, consistent with the lab results, the probability of 
re-enter the competition for girls who fail to reach the threshold girls reduced by 20 % to 
40 % while boys seem to be not affected. As the highly competitive national and 
forthcoming international Olympiad mainly attract talented students, the findings may help 
in explaining why female students are still lag behind in STEM fields. Also, the effects may 
deter women from seizing the opportunity for promotion at the workplaces. 
Similarly, Hoyer et al. (2016) also focus on Dutch university students and confirm that past 
failure would deter women from self-selection into competition. 51 % of male students and 
33 % of female students select the tournament. The gender gap emerges among students 
who are not in the top 25 %, in particular there’s a gender gap (59 % vs. 25 %) among the 
bottom 50 % of students. By contrast, 48 % of the top 25 % of female students enter the 
tournament, as often as male students do. As subjects don’t know their absolute or relative 
performance throughout the experiment, low-ability female students make their entry 
decision based on the prior academic performance at high school. Specifically, they use 
prior Math scores to assess their probability of winning. However, men and talented female 
students are not affected by their high school experiences. 
Buser et al. (2016) explore whether people would be more conservative and choose safer 
options, or keep seeking challenges after experiencing failure. In the experiment, after 
completing the first round two-people winner-take-all tournament, each participant is 
informed of absolute performance, and two-thirds of them would know the results of 
competition. The differences of available information create three groups: winner, loser, or 
no information (which serves as control group). In the second round, participants need to 
decide the incentive compensation. In addition, they are required to set a goal for their 
performance. The upper bound is 20 questions. They would be paid only if they live up to 
their expectation.  
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On average, subjects solve 10.4 questions correctly in the first round; the chosen target is 
9.3 and participants solve 10.5 questions correctly in the second round. The success rate is 
81 %.  
There are no gender differences in performance or selected goals. Men and women of same 
ability pick on the same goals. 
After controlling for performance in the first round, they find that losers select a 
significantly challenging goal than winners, with a coefficient value of 0.5. Winners and 
control group choose similar targets. Contrary to expectation, losers are not discouraged by 
failures. However, losers still perform significantly worse than winners, solve 0.8 fewer 
questions. The worse performance and higher target lead to a 17-percentage-point success 
rate gap between winners and losers.  
However, male and female losers react to their failures differently. The higher target is 
driven by male losers. On average, compare with male winners, they expect themselves to 
solve about 0.95 more question (p < 0.05). The worse performance is resulted from female 
losers. On average, female losers solve 1.7 fewer questions than female winners (p <0 .05). 
Average women choose a significantly lower target than male losers (differences: 0.74, p = 
0.051) whereas slightly higher than male winners differences (0.29, p = 0.286). Average 
males significantly outperform female losers (difference: 1.1, p = 00008) whereas female 
winners perform better than average males (difference: 0.54, p = 00293). This indicates that 
both the effect of on challenge seeking for men and on performance for women are caused 
by failure rather than success.  
Berlin et al. (2016) provide support and explanations for Buser et al. (2016). They find 
women and men don’t react in the same way. When participants receive negative feedbacks 
that their performance is below median, women update their beliefs more pessimistically 
than men of equal ability. The first four rounds are organized exactly same as Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007), while before making decisions at the third round, students need to guess 
their ranks in the second round. Before the fifth round, students are told whether their 
performance is below or above median. After providing feedbacks, the authors again ask 
students to guess ranks in the second round and let subjects to choose compensation 
schemes for the performance in fifth round. In the sixth round, participants are divided into 
two groups and required to apply their performance in the first round in which they perform 
in a non-competitive piece rate environment. Participants in Ability Group compare their 
first-round performance with opponent of same ability, while there are no changes for 
control group consists of participants in Repetition.  
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There are no gender differences in performance in first two rounds, and also no differences 
in the beliefs about ranks among below-median participants before they receive feedback. 
However, below-median men become more confident than female counterparts after 
obtaining feedback. By contrast, above-median males are always more confident but the 
feedback closes the gender gap to some extent. Women become less confident after 
receiving negative feedback and more confident after receiving positive feedback. After 
being told they are below median, compared to an agent who his beliefs about performance 
in the second round in a Bayesian way, women are more likely to think they are in the 
bottom 25 %.  
As the authors use diff-in-diff to estimate the effects of feedback on sixth-round decision, 
the variable of interest is thus the interaction term AbilityGroup * Decision. The 
coefficients are positive and significant for both below-median women (0.30, p = 0.04) and 
men (0.33, p = 0.02). The negative effect is limited on above-median males and females. 
The coefficient on the interaction term Belief* Decision is significantly negative for 
women, indicates that women react more strongly to feedback when they did not expect it. 
Further analysis suggests that the effects of feedback on sixth-round decision work through 
beliefs. Women respond to feedback on their individual performance whereas men respond 
mainly to the level of their opponent. Below-median men believe they would perform 
better over time after entering a tournament whereas it’s not the case for females.  
6. Conclusion 
Despite considerable progress over the past several decades, the gender gap in STEM fields 
and wage remains persistent and substantial. Gender differences in competition offer a new 
perspective for gender differences in real outcomes apart from traditional factors such as 
gender differences in labor supply and discrimination. The experimental designs introduced 
by Gneezy et al. (2003) and Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) serve as building blocks for 
future researches to detect, evaluate and analyze this issue. 
There is a broad consensus that men exhibit less competition aversion than women in 
economically advanced countries. Current literatures suggest that a number of factors help 
shape competition preferences at different stages in the human life cycle. Existing analyses 
also show that this psychological factor has potential to explain gender differences in 
education and labor market outcomes. 
However, the relative importance remains unclear. Several papers argue that though this 
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explanation is intriguing, could only account for a small proportion of gender pay gap. 
Besides, there are three main problems. First, only a few papers try to connect willingness 
to compete with real life outcomes despite of despite abundant empirical evidence in the 
lab. Hence, further studies should prove this explanation still make sense outside the lab 
rather than just determine an already identified pattern. Second, robustness check is needed 
for lab experiments. How agent would behave at large stakes and in several rounds of 
competition is still an open question. Also, under most circumstance, the sample consists of 
high school or college students. To what extent the results derived from these two groups 
could apply to general population remain to be determined. The main driving forces of 
gender gap in willingness to compete are crucial for policymakers, yet still under debate. 
Moreover, before encourage women to enter the competition, it’s important to figure out 
would competitiveness be a desirable trait? Last but not least, to my knowledge, until now 
there are no papers track changes in competition preference over time, which is unrealistic. 
The scarcity in field data causes troubles for building causal relationships.  
Overall, the regarding literature is growing and rich. This new explanation provides the 
possibility to interpret gender gap from a psychological point of view. However, this line of 
research is just a beginning, there are still a lot of problems further researches have to cope 
with.  
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